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Synopsis 
Share repurchases have long been permitted in the United States of America, but it is 
only relatively recently that they have become a frequently-used means of returning funds 
to shareholders in that country. In other countries, it was also only relatively recently that 
share repurchases were even permitted, and in South Africa, repurchases have been 
permitted only since 1999, when the Companies Act was amended to allow for them. 
Repurchases in South Africa are fairly closely regulated, not only by statute, but also, in 
the case of listed shares, by regulations contained in the Listing Requirements of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. In essence, the regulations, read with the legislation, 
allow for three types of repurchase, namely, a specific repurchase incorporating a pro 
rata offer; a specific purchase incorporating a specific offer, and a general repurchase. 
Specific repurchases have more demanding requirements than general repurchases as far 
as public announcements are concerned, and as such, they provide greater scope for 
analysis in the context of the "signalling hypothesis," and for that reason, the focus of this 
study is on specific repurchases. 
Studies in the USA and elsewhere have shown that repurchases may be carried out for 
any of a number of reasons. Most studies in the USA have also shown that repurchases 
are associated with significant positive abnormal returns on the share prices; the increase 
in prices is usually attributed to the signalling hypothesis, which holds that managers use 
repurchases as a means of signalling to the market that they believe that the shares are 
underpriced. 
The objectives of the present study are twofold: 
• To identify the reasons for South African companies carrying out repurchases; 
and 
• To determine whether such repurchases create shareholder value 
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For purposes of both objectives, repurchases complying with certain criteria were 
selected and analysed. It was found that the stated reasons for specific repurchases most 
frequently related to the enhancement of value. In order to determine whether 
repurchases did in fact enhance value, the Cumulative Abnormal Return technique was 
applied. It was found that specific repurchases are followed by an immediate, obvious 
and sustained increase in Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. On the other hand, 
indi vidual repurchases which resulted in short-term posi ti ve Cumulati ve Abnormal 
Returns were in the majority; but in the long term, they were in the minority. There is 
only tentative evidence to suggest that the size of the repurchase, the type of repurchase, 
the size of the directors' interest, price and reasons for repurchases have an influence on 
the returns. It is concluded that the outcome of a specific repurchase may well be 
unpredictable. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Placing Repurchases in Context 
Since 1999, when share repurchases were permitted for the first time in South Africa, 
considerable use has been made in this country of the repurchase mechanism as a means 
of achieving various corporate objectives, the principal objective being, as shall be shown, 
"to increase shareholder value." Although repurchases have become commonplace in 
South Africa, it remains useful and appropriate to place them in context in order to 
achieve a comprehensive understanding of the repurchase phenomenon, its development 
and its importance. To that end, the next section provides a brief historical background of 
repurchases, both in South Africa and elsewhere. 
1.2 A Brief History of Repurchases 
Share repurchases, or stock buy-backs, as they are also commonly known, have been 
recognised and permitted in the United States of America ("USA") for many years. 
Statutes of the various states fairly uniformly vest the power to repurchase shares in 
corporations (Brudney and Bratton, 1993) and the courts of the USA have taken the 
approach that even in the absence of a statute, companies have the power to repurchase 
their shares, unless specifically prohibited (Trichardt et ai, 1989; Blackman et ai, 2002). 
Other jurisdictions (including South Africa) have, however, been slower to permit share 
repurchases. I Largely influenced by English company law, and in particular, by the 
I By 1980, the USA was "one of the few countries in the world which allow(ed) firms to make tender offers 
for their own shares at a price above the market price. The rather negative attitude of legislators of other 
countries (was) generally motivated by a stated desire to protect non-insider investors. The argument (was) 
that insiders could manipulate prices by giving false 'signals' to the market or they could expropriate 
bondholders by reducing the size of their claims on the assets of the firm" (Vermaelen, 1981, P 139). 
Compare this reason with the rationale given below. 
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judgment of the House of Lords in Trevor v Whitworth,2 they applied the rule that a 
company could not, in general terms, repurchase its own shares. The rationale for this 
prohibition was threefold: 
• first, and most importantly, it protected the company's creditors by preventing a 
reduction of the company's capital (the so-called "capital maintenance rule") 
(Blackman et ai, 2002; Ferran, 1999; Trevor v Whitworth); 
• second, it protected the company's shareholders by preventing the company from 
trafficking in its own shares (Blackman et ai, 2002; Ferran, 1999; Trevor v 
Whitworth); 
• third, it prevented unconstitutional conduct by management who might otherwise 
use the power to repurchase shares to rid themselves of troublesome or disaffected 
shareholders (Ferran, 1999). 
In time, however, and largely influenced by practice In the USA, legislation was 
introduced in Canada both at provincial3 and at national4 level to permit repurchases. In 
the United Kingdom, the prohibition was effectively removed in 1981.5 Australia 6 and 
New Zealand7 followed suit in due course. 
The removal of the prohibition had been under consideration in South Africa since at 
least 1985, when the Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law 8 raised the 
question of whether the capital maintenance rule should be abolished.9 The Committee 
began active consideration of the issue in the late 1980's and finally, in 1999, the 
Companies Amendment Act no. 37 of 1999 was passed. This Amendment Act effectively 
did away with the prohibition on repurchases by repealing the old sections 83 and 84 of 
the Companies Act, 1973 ("the Act"), and substituting sections 85 to 90. The 
2 (1887) 12 App Cas 409 (HL) 
3 For example, Ontario's Business Corporations Act 1970 (Ont) s 39 
4 Canada Business Corporations Act 1985 ss 33 - 36 
5 Companies Act, 1981; Companies Act 1985 
6 Australian Corporations Law 
7 New Zealand Companies Act, 1993 
H Established in terms of the Companies Act, 1973 
9 Policy Statement of the Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law, 8 February 1985 
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phenomenon of generally permitted share repurchases is therefore relatively new in South 
Africa, having been in existence for only some six years at the time of writing. IO 
Despite the practice of share repurchases having been long permitted in the USA, it is 
only relatively recently - in the early 1980' s - that US corporations began adopting share 
repurchase programmes in large numbers (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000).11 It has been 
suggested that one reason for the surge in repurchases is that in 1982, for the first time, 
regulatory certainty on share repurchases was achieved when the Securities Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") adopted Rule IOb-18 (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). This rule 
created a "safe harbour" measure whereby legal protection was provided against 
accusations of price manipulation on condition that certain trading limits were followed. 
The introduction of this rule appears to have coincided with oil companies running out of 
investment opportunities, thereby prompting them to repurchase enormous quantities of 
stock (Brudney and Bratton, 1993). Repurchasing activity was not limited to oil 
companies, however, and large companies from other sectors followed suit. In addition, 
at least prior to 1989, a large part of repurchase activity could be attributed to defensive 
action against another 1980' s phenomenon, the hostile takeover bid (Brudney and Bratton, 
1993). 
The repurchase phenomenon spread across the world during the 1990' s, by which time 
other jurisdictions referred to above had enabling legislation in place (Grullon and 
Ikenberry, 2000). During this period, other countries outside the sphere of influence of 
10 Prior to the amendment, reductions in capital by South African companies were possible, but only in very 
clearly defined circumstances. The pre-amendment s 83 of the Companies Act permitted reductions in 
capital if, amongst other requirements, the company had no creditors or if all of its creditors consented to 
the reduction. Alternatively, a company could reduce its capital pursuant to confirmation by the Court. 
II It is interesting to note that there was in fact an earlier upsurge in repurchasing activity in the USA. In 
1971, the US Government imposed a "voluntary" 4% limit on dividend increases. It was found that during 
the period of controls (August 1971 to June 1974) there was a dramatic increase in repurchasing activity 
(Vermaelen, 1981); premiums also increased from an average of 11.61% to 26.41% (Vermaelen,1981). 
Particularly intriguing about this phenomenon is the fact that although controls were imposed in 1971, it 
was not until 1973 that the real boom in activity emerged: this coincided with the lifting of mandatory wage 
controls which included the prohibition on exercising stock options. Vermaelen suggests that one 
explanation for this is that by restricting executive compensation, the government removed the incentive for 
managers to act in the best interests of non-insider shareholders. 
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English law, such as Gennany, Taiwan and Japan, adopted provisions for the first time 
which allowed firms to repurchase their own shares (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
Share repurchase programmes have become an important payout method for many US 
finns, and it is estimated that between 1984 and 2000, US corporations spent 
approximately 26% of their total annual earnings on repurchases (Grullon and Michaely, 
2004). In 1999 and 2000, for the first time in history, industrial corporations spent more 
money on share repurchases than they did on dividends (Grullon and Michaely, 2004). 
1.3 Justification for this Research 
Given the popularity in the USA of repurchasing shares as a method of making payments 
to shareholders, it is not surprising that the bulk of literature on this phenomenon 
emanates from that country. There is a large and growing body of research on the reasons 
for repurchases in the USA and on the effect thereof on shareholder wealth, details of 
which are discussed in later chapters. 
South Africa, by contrast, appears to have produced very little in the way of academic 
writing on the subject. This is not to suggest that repurchases have little role to play in 
South Africa; on the contrary, although repurchases in South Africa are nowhere near the 
levels experienced in the USA, they have become sufficiently entrenched in the corporate 
landscapel2 to merit analysis of the phenomenon in the South African context. 
It would be very easy to assume that the results of US research hold good for South 
Africa; but it must be remembered that relative length of experience of the repurchase 
phenomenon, local conditions and especially the local regulatory environment in South 
Africa all differ from those in the USA, and for that reason, a separate study of 
repurchases from the South African perspective is not only desirable but also necessary. 
12 According to Ernst & Young's Mergers and Acquisitions, 2002, 79, 110 and 123 repurchases were 
carried out by South African companies in 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively. 
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1.4 Research Questions and Objectives 
There are two primary focuses of interest in a study of this nature. The first relates to the 
reasons for carrying out repurchases. Assuming that managers of companies are rational 
beings whose primary function is to serve the interest of shareholders, they must have 
sound reasons for any act which they perform as stewards of their companies, including 
the act of repurchasing shares. The second relates to the consequences of their acts. 
Having regard to the reasons for the repurchase, do their acts in fact benefit the 
shareholders? This research will therefore consider the following questions: 
• Why do finns in South Africa repurchase shares? and 
• Do share repurchases create shareholder value? 
It follows, therefore, that the objectives of researching this topic are twofold: 
• First, to identify the reasons for South African companies carrying out 
repurchases; 
• Second, to determine whether such repurchases create shareholder value, by 
reference to the returns of the shares concerned. 
In order to achieve these objectives, it was necessary to follow a comprehensive approach 
to examining repurchases, so as to provide a thorough understanding of the phenomenon. 
This study was, therefore, multidisciplinary in character, drawing as it did on various 
sources of learning, including law, quantitative analysis, economics of financial markets, 
corporate governance and finance theory. 
Given the depth of experience on the topic in the USA, considerable attention was paid to 
research carried out in that country. Where appropriate and available, commentary from 
the United Kingdom was also examined. This study involved a close examination of the 
theory and empirical studies relating to repurchases carried out in those countries. The 
challenge was to apply the benefit of that experience to the South African situation. 
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In order to provide a thorough understanding of the context for repurchases in South 
Africa, it was necessary to consider in some detail the regulatory environment relating to 
repurchases in this country. A theoretical and regulatory framework having thus been 
established, attention was turned to an examination of empirical evidence relating to 
repurchases, in order to achieve the objectives referred to above. 
1.5 Organisation of Study 
The remainder of this study is organised in the following chapters: 
• Chapter 2 The Regulatory Environment Governing Share Repurchases: This 
study is based to a large extent on the premise that in order to achieve an 
understanding of the scope, import and consequences of repurchases, it is 
necessary to understand the regulatory environment within which repurchases are 
carried out. This chapter examines the regulatory environment in South Africa 
and attempts to place repurchases within the regulatory context; 
• Chapter 3 Literature Review: This chapter provides a review of the body of 
literature which was consulted for purposes of this research; 
• Chapter 4 The Effect of Repurchases on Shareholder Value: Theory: This chapter 
examines the theory behind the effects of repurchases on shareholder wealth; 
• Chapter 5 Methodology: Whereas the preceding chapters are concerned mainly 
with issues relating to the theory and context of repurchases, this chapter 
describes the methodology applied to the collection and analysis of empirical 
evidence; 
• Chapter 6 Research Results: This chapter, employing the methodology described 
in Chapter 5, examines the actual reasons for repurchases in South Africa, and 
examines the actual effect of repurchases in South Africa on shareholder wealth; 
• Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations. 
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Chapter 2 
The Regulatory Environment Governing Share Repurchases 
2.1 Introduction 
As has been pointed out, most studies relating to share repurchases have been carried out 
in the USA. The danger of placing reliance on those studies when trying to comprehend 
the repurchase phenomenon in South Africa is that the regulatory environment - which 
will inevitably influence the nature and extent of repurchase activity - may well be, and 
in fact is, very different in the two countries. 
A clear understanding of the regulatory environment in South Africa is essential in order 
to achieve an understanding of the scope, import and consequences of repurchases. Share 
repurchases neither exist nor are carried out in a vacuum; rather (certainly in South Africa) 
the notion of repurchases exists by virtue of statute and their application is governed by 
statute and delegated regulation. In addition, as will be shown later, the nature of the 
regulatory environment has to some extent shaped the methodology employed in the 
present research. The purpose of this chapter is to consider briefly the regulatory 
environment in the USA, so that the studies referred to above can be placed in context, 
and then to consider in somewhat greater detail the regulatory environment in South 
Africa, in order to achieve the ends stated at the beginning of this paragraph. 
2.2 The Regulatory Environment in the USA 
It was mentioned earlier that although repurchasing has long been permitted in the USA, 
it is only relatively recently that repurchase activity has become commonplace and 
sustained.! It was suggested that the increase in this activity is due, at least in part, to the 
introduction in 1982 of the first rule that provides any legal structure and protection, as 
I See Chapter 1. 
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far as alleged manipulation is concerned, to the buy-back process in the USA.2 This was 
in the form of SEC Rule lOb-I 8.3 It seems that this rule sufficiently reduced uncertainty 
over potential litigation to allow the surge in repurchase activity in the 1980' sand 1990' s. 
The critical point about Rule IOb-18 is that it provides no limitations as to what 
companies can and cannot do; rather, the rule provides a "safe harbour" that gives legal 
protection to companies against accusations of price manipulation, provided that four 
trading limits are followed. A company will be deemed not to have violated the anti-
manipulative provisions of other SEC rules if its transactions on any given day: 
• are made only through one broker or dealer; 
• are not executed at the opening or during the last half hour of trading; 
• are not done at a price exceeding the highest current independent bid price or the 
last independent sale price, whichever is the higher; and 
• if the total repurchase volume does not exceed 25% of average daily trading 
volume calculated over the preceding four weeks. 4 
The first limit is intended to place some responsibility on the broker or dealer for 
following the rules and also limits the firm from appearing to hide its trades. The limit of 
one broker or dealer is applied on a day-to-day basis, not for the entire programme. The 
second provision limits the firm from affecting prices at either opening or close of trading, 
two times at which the firm's last traded price can be an important benchmark value for 
establishing exchange ratios in takeovers or determining payouts from compensation 
reward plans. The third provision serves as an "up-tick" limit and keeps the company 
from forcing its share price to trade at a higher price tick. The last provision aims to limit 
the volume of trade in the share (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
Inasmuch as Rule 10b-18 is a "safe harbour" rule, it imposes no mandatory limit on a 
firm's ability to trade, but it does provide protection against litigation for manipulation if 
the firm remains within the trading limits. It seems that firms do not always obey the 
2 See Chapter 1. 
3 This rule was amended in 2003. 
4 See Brudney and Bratton (1993), pp 640 - 650. 
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limitations imposed by the rule. 5 Nonetheless, it appears that companies are at least 
sensitive to the spirit of the rule (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
Apart from Rule I Ob-I8, "there is a surprising lack of regulatory structure" (Grullon and 
Ikenbery, 2000, p 48) in the USA, other than compulsory initial disclosures on the market. 
2.3 The Regulatory Environment in South Africa 
In South Africa, the repurchase process is much more closely regulated than in the USA. 
It is not proposed that this study should deal exhaustively with the detail of the relevant 
legislation and regulations in South Africa, but rather that an overview be provided in 
order to allow an understanding of the framework and the limitations within which 
repurchases may be carried out. The emphasis will be on the regulatory environment as it 
relates to share repurchases in listed companies. 
2.4 Statutory Provisions 
The relevant statutory provisions are contained in sections 85 to 89 of the Companies Act, 
1973, as amended.6 The principal features of these provisions are discussed below. 
The principal enabling provision is section 85(1), which provides that a company may by 
special resolution approve the acquisition of shares issued by it, if authorised thereto by 
its articles. Apart from the requirement that the articles of the company permit the 
repurchase, the key requirement is that the authorisation be by way of special resolution. 
This requirement is no doubt aimed at protecting the interests of the shareholders, by 
requiring their approval rather than merely that of the directors. Whether this aim is in 
fact achieved is open to question. The Act does not have any requirement specific to 
repurchases whereby any information regarding a repurchase must be conveyed to 
shareholders, although it does require that notice of any special resolution must state the 
5 Grullon and Ikenberry refer in p47 to a study conducted on 64 repurchase programmes which were carried 
out in 1993 and 1994; it found that less than 10% of programmes followed to the letter all of the 
requirements of Rule lOb-iS. 
6 By the Companies Amendment Act, no 37 of 1999 
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"terms and effect of the resolution and the reasons for it.,,7 Whether that requirement is in 
itself sufficient is open to question, and if it is not sufficient, then it is of doubtful value, 
for in order for it to be effective, shareholder consent must be informed (Trichardt et ai, 
1989).8 In any event, it has been argued that 
"as a more fundamental matter, there IS reason to doubt whether shareholder 
approval makes more than a nominal contribution to corporate democracy. In the 
case of private companies, where management is either identical with or generally 
responsive to shareholder concerns, such a requirement is superfluous. In the case 
of publicly held companies, most shareholders are concerned only with dividend 
policy and share price performance. This apathy and the high cost of organising a 
proxy contest enable management, with the support of 15-20% of the shareholders, 
to control the outcome of even those decisions requiring a supermajority 
approval. 9 In short, the various legislative approaches to legal authorisation for 
repurchases raise matters of high principle but little real substance." (Trichardt et aI, 
1989, p105) 
Section 85(2) provides that the approval may be a general approval or a specific approval 
for a particular transaction. The Act does not define the nature and consequences of a 
general approval as opposed to a specific approval, save to state in section 85 (3) that a 
general approval is valid only until the next annual general meeting or if it is revoked 
earlier by any general meeting.1O 
Section 85(4) provides that a company may not make any payment to repurchase any 
share if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the company is or would after the 
payment be unable to pay its debts in the ordinary course of business, or if the 
consolidated assets of the company fairly valued would be less than the consolidated 
liabilities. In other words, this section provides a liquidity test and a solvency or "balance 
7 Companies Act, s 199 (1) 
8 The JSE Listing Requirements do impose more specific provisions for repurchases in the case of listed 
companies - see Section 2.5 below. 
9 As in the case of a special resolution 
10 The JSE Listing Requirements supplement the rather sparse provisions of Section 85(2) of the Act - see 
p 13 below. 
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sheet" test which restricts the funds available to the net assets of the company (Blackman 
et aI, 2002). 
Sections 85(5) and 85(6) provide respectively for the decrease in issued capital and stated 
capital of a company pursuant to an acquisition of shares. Section 85(7) provides that if 
par value shares are acquired at a premium over par value, such premium may be paid out 
of reserves, including statutory non-distributable reserves. Section 85(8) provides that 
shares acquired under section 85 shall be cancelled as ordinary shares and restored to the 
status of authorised shares "forthwith"; and section 85(9) in effect prohibits a company 
from acquiring all of its shares. 1 1 
Section 86 deals with the liability of directors and other consequences if the provisions of 
section 85 (4) are not complied with. It need not detain us further. 
Section 87(1), read with section 87(2), does not apply to listed shares, and section 87(3) 
concerns formalities regarding documents. Section 87(4) deals with pro rata purchases of 
non-listed shares. Section 87(5) deals with certain notification requirements. Again, these 
provisions need not detain us further. 
Section 87(6) provides that a stock exchange may determine further requirements with 
which a company whose shares are listed on such exchange shall comply prior to such 
company acquiring its own shares. As will be seen later,12 most of the detail regarding 
repurchases of listed shares is provided by requirements laid down by the JSE Securities 
Exchange of South Africa ("JSE"). 
Section 88 deals with the enforceability of contracts for the acquisition of shares, and 
need not concern us unduly. 
11 "Shares in the capital of a company may not be acquired under this section if, as a result of such 
acquisition, there would no longer be any shares in issue other than convertible or redeemable shares." This 
may seem to be a case of stating the obvious, but it is not inconceivable that an argument could be made 
that in the absence of this prohibition, a company could repurchase all of its shares and be left in the 
curious position of having no share capital. 
12 See Section 2.5 below. 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
12 
Section 89 provides that a subsidiary company may acqUIre shares in its holding 
company up to a maximum of 10% in the aggregate of the number of shares in the 
holding company. Prior to the 1999 amendments to the Companies Act, a company was 
prohibited (subject to certain exceptions) from holding shares in its holding company.13 
Section 89 must be read with the now amended section 39(1) which provides that if 
shares are acquired in terms of section 89 by a subsidiary, then for so long as such shares 
are held by the subsidiary, no voting rights attaching to those shares may be exercised 
and the percentage of votes which may be cast at any meeting of shareholders must be 
reduced by the number of shares held by the subsidiary. 
Shares in a company which are acquired by its subsidiary are for practical purposes, but 
not strictly speaking, treasury shares (Blackman et ai, 2002). This means that "full blown 
trafficking in the shares of the holding company by its subsidiary is possible. No doubt 
this will result in many repurchases being structured as purchases by a subsidiary." 
(Blackman et ai, 2002, p 5 -100). 
The question has been raised as to why a subsidiary would want to purchase the shares in 
its holding company, and was considered in a judgment l4 in which it was held that the 
holding company could not possibly benefit economically from the purchase "save to 
speculate ... with its own shares.,,15 Although this judgment was delivered before the 1999 
amendments to the Companies Act were introduced, the same considerations apply, and 
if the views expressed in the judgment are correct, one wonders why the amendment 
permitting the purchase of shares by a subsidiary was enacted. 16 
13 In tenns of s 39 (I) as it existed prior to the amendment 
14 In The Unisec Group Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1986 (3) SA 259 (T) 265 
15 The Unisec Group Ltd v Sage Holdings 
16 The purchase of treasury shares may have consequences for the purposes of Secondary Tax on 
Companies, but this does not appear to have been a factor in the formulation of the amendment to the 
Companies Act. 
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2.5 The JSE Listing Requirements 
The provisions of the Act, as far as they relate to repurchases, are sketched in broad terms. 
The Act leaves the detail of regulating repurchases, at least as far as shares in listed 
companies are concerned, to the stock exchanges, which in effect means the JSE.17 The 
regulations covering repurchases as laid down by the JSE are contained in the JSE Listing 
Requirements, and their import and effect are discussed below. 
Paragraph 5.67 of the Listing Requirements provides that an acquisition by a company of 
its own securities or a purchase by a subsidiary of securities in its holding company in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Companies Act constitutes a repurchase of 
securities, in which case the holding company must comply with the relevant provisions 
of the Listing Requirements. As does the Companies Act, the Listing Requirements 
distinguish initially between two types of repurchases, namely, those that are effected: 
"(a) on terms that are approved by securities holders in a general meeting in respect 
of that particular repurchase ('a specific repurchase of securities'), which shall be 
valid until such time as the approval is amended or revoked by a special resolution; 
or 
(b) generally approved by securities holders by the giving of a renewable mandate, 
which shall be valid until the company's next annual general meeting or for 15 
months from the date of the resolution, whichever period is shorter, to the directors 
of the company to repurchase its securities subject to the requirements of the JSE 
and to any other restrictions set out in the mandate ('a general repurchase of 
securities' )." 18 
The use of the terms "a specific repurchase of securities" and "a general repurchase of 
securities" in the Requirements is perhaps somewhat unfortunate and confusing. It will be 
remembered that the Companies Act refers to a "general approval or a specific approval 
for a particular acquisition,,,19 whilst the Requirements refer to a "specific repurchase" or 
17 Companies Act, s 87 (6) 
18 Listing Requirements, par 5.67 
19 Companies Act, s 85 (2) 
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a "general repurchase." This usage might, in the mind of the reader, equate the authority 
to repurchase with the actual act of repurchase, when they are in fact two separate steps 
in the process. In any event, the terms "specific repurchase" and "general repurchase" as 
used in the Requirements refer respectively to a repurchase carried out pursuant to a 
"specific approval" and a repurchase carried out pursuant to a "general approval" as 
contemplated in section 85 (2) of the Act. 
Paragraph 5.68 of the Requirements provides that the general repurchase by a company 
of its own securities shall not, in the aggregate in anyone financial year, exceed 20% of 
that company's issued share capital of that class. The imposition of this level, although 
fairly high, was clearly designed to prevent market manipulation. 
Paragraph 5.69 of the Requirements somewhat obliquely divides specific repurchases 
into two further categories, namely a repurchase "which includes a pro rata offer (being 
an offer to all securities holders pro rata to their existing holdings)" and "a specific offer 
(being an offer from [sic fO securities holders specifically named)." The Requirements 
therefore contemplate three types of repurchase in all, namely: 
• a specific repurchase incorporating a pro rata offer; 
• a specific repurchase incorporating a specific offer; and 
• a general repurchase. 
Paragraph 5.69 goes on to provide that a company may only make a specific repurchase 
subject to certain conditions, the most important of which are that: 
(a) authorisation thereto must be given by its articles;21 
20 The word "from" is as contained in the Listing Requirements. It is probable that it was instead intended 
that the word "to" be used - it would certainly make more sense in the context. 
21 This reflects the provisions of s 85 (1) of the Act. 
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(b) approval must have been gIven In terms of a special resolution of the 
company by securities holders excluding, in the case of a specific offer, any 
shareholder and its associates that are participating in the repurchase;22 
(c) a statement must be issued by the directors that after considering the effect of 
such repurchase the: 
(i) company and the group will be able in the ordinary course of business 
to pay its debts for a period of 12 months after the date of approval of 
the circular; and 
(ii) assets of the company and the group will be in excess of the 
liabilities of the company and the group for a period of 12 months after 
the date of the approval of the circular. For this purpose, the assets and 
liabilities should be recognised and measured in accordance with the 
accounting policies used in the latest audited consolidated annual 
financial statements;23 and 
(iii) share capital and reserves of the company and the group will be 
adequate for ordinary business purposes for a period of 12 months after 
the date of approval of the circular; and 
(iv) working capital of the company and the group will be adequate for 
ordinary business purposes for a period of 12 months after the date of 
approval of the circular;24 
(d) in the case of a specific offer, a statement must be issued from an independent 
professional expert, indicating whether or not the premium paid is fair and 
reasonable to shareholders of the company if such premium is greater than 
10% of the weighted average of the market value for the securities for the five 
22 Whilst the Act also requires the passing of a special resolution, the requirement that participating 
shareholders be excluded is original to the Listing Requirements. 
23 The effect of c (i) and (ii) is to compel the directors of the company to affirm that the provisions of s 8S( 4) 
of the Act will be complied with. 
24 The provisions of c (iii) and (iv) are original to the Listing Requirements and are thus additional to the 
Act. 
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business days immediately preceding the date on which the transaction was 
d 'f h .. kn 25 agree , or I t e prermum IS un own;' 
(e) a pro rata offer must remain open for 21 days and must be effected In 
accordance with the timetable provided in the Requirements; 
(f) where a repurchase by a company of its own securities is to be made from a 
related party, such repurchase shall be subject to the issuer providing its 
securities holders with a statement from an independent professional expert, 
indicating whether or not the repurchase is fair and reasonable to securities 
holders of the issuer; 
(g) issuers may only undertake a repurchase of securities if, after such repurchase, 
it still complies with shareholder spread requirements; 
(h) if a company has announced that it will make a specific repurchase, it must 
pursue the proposal, unless the JSE permits the company not to do SO;26 and 
(i) a company or its subsidiary may not repurchase securities during a prohibited 
period as defined in the Requirements. 
Paragraph 5.72 deals with the requirements relating to general repurchases, namely that: 
(a) the repurchase of securities being effected through the order book operated by 
the JSE trading system and done without any prior understanding or 
arrangement between the company and the counter party (reported trades are 
prohibited); 
(b) authorisation thereto being gi ven by its articles; 
(c) approval by shareholders in terms of a special resolution of the company, in 
annual general/general meeting, which shall be valid only until the next 
annual general meeting or for 15 months from the date of the resolution, 
whichever period is shorter; 
25 The object of this provision is c1earl y to protect remaining shareholders from too high a price being paid. 
26 For a discussion of the significance of this provision, see p 58, esp. footnote 16 therein. 
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(d) repurchases may not be made at a price greater than 10% above the weighted 
average of the market value for the securities for the five business days 
immediately preceding the date on which the transaction is effected. The JSE 
should be consulted for a ruling if the applicants securities have not traded in 
such five business day period; 
(e) at any point in time, a company may only appoint one agent to effect any 
repurchase(s) on the company's behalf; 
(f) issuers may only undertake a repurchase of securities if, after such repurchase, 
it still complies with shareholder spread requirements; 
(g) an issuer or its subsidiary may not repurchase securities during a prohibited 
period as defined. 
The Listing Requirements make provision for documents, circulars, announcements and 
other information which is required to be published in relation to repurchases. Different 
requirements apply to different types of repurchase, and as it is this difference in 
requirements which influenced the research methodology employed in this study, these 
requirements will now be examined in more detail. 
Paragraph 11.23 of the Listing Requirements provides that in the case of a specific 
repurchase, a circular must be distributed amongst shareholders which contains, amongst 
other things, the following information: 
1. the reason for, and method by which a company intends to repurchase its 
securities including the number of securities to be repurchased and the price to be 
·d 27 pal ; 
2. the effect on earnings per share, headline earnings per share, net asset value per 
share and tangible net asset value per share of the proposed repurchase;28 
3. a statement as to the source of funds to be utilised;29 
27 Par 11.23 (c) 
28 Par 11.23 (f) 
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4. in the case of a specific repurchase, a statement complying with Schedule 5, from 
an independent professional expert acceptable to the JSE, indicating whether or 
not the premium paid is fair and reasonable to shareholders of the company if 
such premium is greater than 10% of the weighted average of the market value for 
the securities for the five business days immediately preceding the date on which 
the transaction was agreed.3o 
In addition, paragraph 11.24 requires that in the case of a pro rata offer, announcements 
must be made in accordance with the relevant timetable contained in Schedule 24; and 
paragraph 11.25 provides that in the case of a specific repurchase from a specific 
shareholder(s), the announcement must contain the following: 
(a) the terms of the repurchase; 
(b) the date of the general meeting at which the specific authority will be 
sought; 
(c) the shareholders from whom the specific repurchase is to be made; 
(d) the date on which the repurchase is to be made and the date on which the 
securities will be cancelled and the listing terminated, if applicable; 
(e) the effects on earnings per share, headline earnings per share, net asset 
value per share and tangible net asset value per share; and 
(f) a statement that a circular containing details of the above will be dispatched 
to shareholders. 
As far as general repurchases are concerned, paragraph 11.26 provides, amongst other 
things, that if a company is seeking a general authority to purchase its own securities, a 
circular must be sent to securities holders, including a notice of the annual general or 
29 Par 11.23 (h) 
30 Par 11.23 (i) 
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other general meeting, and including amongst other things, a statement of the board of 
directors' intention regarding the utilisation of the authority sought.3l 
In addition, paragraph 11.27 requires that when a company has cumulatively repurchased 
3% of the initial number (the number of that class of shares in issue at the time that 
general authority from shareholders is granted) of the relevant class of securities, and for 
each 3% in aggregate of the initial number of that class acquired thereafter, an 
announcement must be made. Such announcement must be made as soon as possible and 
in any event by not later than 08h30 on the second business day following the day on 
which the relevant threshold is reached or exceeded, and must contain, amongst other 
things, the following information: 
(a) the date(s) of repurchase(s) of securities; 
(b) the highest and lowest prices paid for securities so repurchased; 
(c) the number and value of securities repurchased; 
(d) the extent of the authority outstanding by number and percentage 
(calculated using the number of shares in issue before any repurchases 
were effected); 
(e) a statement as to the source of funds utilised. 
Finally, it should be noted that paragraph 5.75 provides that whenever a company wishes 
to use repurchased shares which are held as "treasury securities,,32 by a subsidiary of the 
company, such use must comply with the Listing Requirements as if such use was a fresh 
issue of securities. 
31 Par 11.26 (c) 
32 As has been discussed, shares held by a subsidiary are not technically "treasury shares"; it is interesting 
to note, however, that the Requirements describe such shares as "treasury securities." 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
o  
Ca
pe
 To
wn
20 
2.6 Specific Repurchases vs. General Repurchases 
It will be readily seen that the requirements relating to general repurchases are, of 
necessity, far less specific than those relating to specific repurchases. Two such 
requirements for specific repurchases are of particular importance in influencing research 
methodology: 
• The first IS the requirement under paragraph 11.23 which provides that the 
circular referred to in that paragraph must state the reason for, and method by 
which a company intends to repurchase its securities including the number of 
securities to be repurchased and the price to be paid; 
• The second is the fact that each specific repurchase must be announced. 
In combination, these requirements provide a publicly recorded source of information 
regarding the reasons for repurchases being conducted, and also provide a publicly 
recorded source of information regarding the nature, extent and terms of repurchase. 
Finally, and rather importantly, they enable the exact date on which the intended 
repurchase becomes public knowledge to be established. These elements are of great 
value for purposes of determining the effect of repurchases on shareholder wealth.33 
The requirements relating to general repurchases are quite different. Whilst a company is 
required to issue a circular to shareholders if it intends to obtain a general authority,34 the 
fact that it is seeking such authority does not mean that it intends actually to repurchase 
any shares. 35 Hence there is no signalling value to be found in such a circular. 36 As 
33 Daly states (in p 39) that "In South Africa it is not typical (nor is it a legal/regulatory requirement) for a 
company to announce that it is launching a share repurchase programme and the first announcement to the 
public relating to a share repurchase is the announcement that is required by the JSE once a company has 
repurchased a tranche of 3% of its shares." This is true enough of general repurchases but, as has been 
shown, this is certainly not true of specific repurchases. 
34 Par 11.26 
35 Of 264 JSE-Iisted companies whose Annual Reports for 2004 included notices of Annual General 
Meetings, 150 (or 57%) contained proposals for special resolutions granting general authority to the 
companies concerned to repurchase shares. The majority of these contained a statement to the effect that 
although a general authority was being sought, it was not then anticipated that the authority would be used. 
It seems therefore that the trend is towards obtaining such general authority as a matter of course at Annual 
General Meetings, whether or not it is intended to use that authority. That being the case, information 
relating to authority for general repurchases as contained in the circulars is of no signalling value. 
36 The importance of signalling is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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discussed above, it is also a requirement that announcements be made when 3% 
h h ld d d I h h .. 37 b t res 0 s are reache un er genera repurc ase aut ontIes,· ut as these 
announcements are made ex post facto, they are of relatively limited signalling value. 
Considering the different requirements relating to general repurchases and specific 
repurchases, and the different value of the information content of those types of 
repurchase, the empirical analysis contained in this study will focus on specific 
repurchases, for the following reasons: 
• in the case of specific repurchases, the announcement date, the actual date of 
repurchase and the repurchase price are known before the purchase is carried out, 
whereas with general repurchases, the repurchase dates and repurchase prices are 
infrequently reported before implementation commences; 
• because specific repurchases are potentially substantially larger than general 
repurchases (which are limited to 20% of the company's issued share capital in 
any financial year),38 the effects are potentially likely to be more pronounced and 
therefore more readily observable in a specific repurchase sample; 
• the extent of public disclosure of the terms of repurchase is significantly greater 
for specific repurchases than for general repurchases, which provides greater 
likelihood that the full impact of the repurchase will be observed at or around the 
announcement date. 39 
2.7 Summary 
The salient features of the regulatory requirements relating to repurchases in South Africa 
may be summarised as follows: 
• Different rules apply to repurchases of shares in non-listed companies and listed 
companies. Repurchases in the former case are governed solely by the Companies 
37 Par 11.27 
38 Par 5.68 
39 As will be seen in Chapter 4, studies in the USA concluded that open market repurchases resulted in 
relatively low abnormal returns and were less likely to signal information. 
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Act, whilst repurchases in the latter case are governed by both the Companies Act 
and the Listing Requirements of the JSE; 
• The Listing Requirements read with the Act in effect provide for three categories 
of repurchases: 
o A specific repurchase incorporating a pro rata offer 
o A specific repurchase incorporating a specific offer 
o A general repurchase; 
• A prerequisite for any repurchase is that the articles of association of the company 
must permit a repurchase; in addition, the repurchase must be approved by a 
special resolution of the company; 
• The requirements of the liquidity test and the insolvency test must be complied 
with; 
• A company may repurchase a maximum of 20% of its shares under a general 
repurchase authority in anyone year. This limit does not apply to specific 
repurchases; 
• Subsidiaries may purchase shares in the capital of their holding company, subject 
to a maximum of 10% of the shares in the aggregate. Such shares are known as 
"treasury securities" in the Requirements, although technically they are not 
treasury shares; 
• The premium which may be paid for any shares is subject to a limitation; 
• Different disclosure requirements apply to specific and general repurchases. 
One of the characteristics of the regulatory provisions in South Africa is that, in principle 
at least, they aim to involve the shareholders closely in the repurchase process. Whether 
in practice this is the case is, as we have seen, 40 open to question. In addition, the 
disclosure requirements relating to specific repurchases are fairly stringent, the intention 
40 See discussion in p 10. 
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no doubt being to enable shareholders to make informed decisions. A side-benefit of 
these requirements is that the market is fully informed about the circumstances 
surrounding a repurchase, and this, intentionally or otherwise, fits in conveniently with 
the signalling hypothesis discussed in succeeding chapters. It is submitted, therefore, that 
regulatory conditions in South Africa are such that potentially, in the case of specific 
repurchases, the signalling hypothesis is able to find full expression. The requirements 
relating to general repurchases are, as has been shown, somewhat different, requiring less 
in terms of disclosure requirements, but also imposing limits as to the scope of share 
acquisitions. The difference in these requirements influenced the choice of methodology 
used in this study. 
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This chapter is concerned with the body of theory and knowledge which has been 
developed in relation to share repurchases. As was mentioned previously, the bulk of 
research and writing on repurchases emanates from the USA, and of necessity, reliance 
must be placed on that country as a source of knowledge, supplemented, where 
appropriate, with contributions from other sources. The purpose of this chapter is to 
review and analyse the principal sources of knowledge pertaining to repurchases in order 
to provide a background for, and better understanding of, the empirical research 
undertaken in this study. 
Literature relating to share repurchases is dealt with in this chapter under the following 
headings: 
• Share repurchases defined; 
• The various types of repurchases; 
• The structural consequences of a repurchase on a company; 
• Theoretical reasons for repurchases; 
• South African literature 
3.2 Share Repurchases Defined 
A share repurchase may be defined as follows: 
"A 'repurchase' or 'buy-back' ... is a transaction entered into between a company 
and one or more of its shareholders in terms of which it is agreed that the company 
will take back their shares in return for an agreed consideration, to be paid by the 
company to the shareholders concerned." (Blackman et ai, 2002, p 5-43) 
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It has been pointed out that, strictly speaking, 
"the company does not 'purchase' or 'buy' its shares. A company cannot acquire 
rights against itself. Its 'acquisition' of the shares puts an end to those rights. 
Although the transaction is not gratuitous from the point of view of the company 
(rights against the company are extinguished), the company does not purchase 
anything. Therefore, strictly speaking, the contract is not a contract of purchase and 
sale." (Blackman et ai, 2002, pp. 5-43). 
It is worth noting that the South African Companies Act does not even use the words 
"repurchase" or "buy-back", but instead uses the word "acquisition" to refer to the 
transaction.! Nonetheless, the terms "repurchase" or "buy-back", although not strictly 
accurate, have become commonly accepted in both legal and financial jargon, and these 
terms will be used to refer to the transaction in this study? 
In some ways, a repurchase is similar to the redemption of shares. In South Africa, even 
prior to the 1999 amendments to the Companies Act, a company had the power to redeem 
preference shares.3 The major difference between a redemption and a repurchase, apart 
from the fact that redemptions usually apply only to preference shares, is that a 
redemption is carried out at the option of the company or the shareholder, as the case may 
be, pursuant to a contract which may be contained in the articles of the company or in the 
terms of issue of the shares. A repurchase, on the other hand, is a transaction between the 
company and one or more of its shareholders under which the company agrees to take 
back its shares for an agreed consideration (Blackman et ai, 2002). In other words, in the 
case of a redemption, the company takes back shares in accordance with rights attaching 
to the shares themselves, whilst in the case of a repurchase, the company takes back 
1 Companies Act, 1973, s 85 
2 The JSE Listing Requirements, which set out in detail the requirements relating to repurchases of listed 
shares, incorporate the more technically correct word "acquisition" into the broader term "repurchase" in 
paragraph 5.67: "An acquisition by a company of its own securities or a purchase by a subsidiary of 
securities in its holding company ... constitutes a repurchase of securities ... " 
3 Companies Act, 1973, s 98 
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shares in accordance with a contract between itself and the shareholders (Blackman et ai, 
2002). 
A repurchase should also be distinguished from a dividend. Marsulis (1980, p 305) 
argues that while an issuer tender offer for common stock is similar to a cash dividend, 
the analogy clearly is not complete since: 
• A stock purchase is generally taxed as a capital gain (or loss) while a dividend is 
taxed as ordinary income in its entirety; 
• A stock purchase requires an associated decrease in total shares outstanding while 
a dividend does not; 
• A stock repurchase is a voluntary transaction by individual shareholders which 
generally alters relative shareholdings, while a dividend is involuntary and has no 
effect on relative shareholdings; 
• A right to tender is non-transferable and its value can only be realized by 
tendering shares or selling shares in the secondary market prior to offer expiration, 
while a dividend is received by all shareholders. 
From the definitions and analyses referred to above, the following essential features of a 
repurchase can be derived in order to provide a working definition for the purposes of 
this research, namely, that a repurchase is: 
• a voluntary transaction ... 
• entered into between a company or its subsidiary and one, some, or all of its 
shareholders ... 
• whereby the company or its subsidiary acquires from those shareholders some4 of 
the shares in the capital of the company ... 
• in exchange for which the company or its subsidiary pays the shareholders a 
consideration ... 
• the immediate effect of which is to reduce the number of issued shares in the 
capital of the company held by "outside" shareholders. 
4 But as was seen in p 11 above, not all of the shares. 
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The concept of share repurchases having been defined, attention is turned in the next 
section to the various types of repurchase. 
3.3 Types of Repurchase 
In the USA, there are three principal methods of repurchasing shares, namely: 
• the fixed-price tender offer; 
• the Dutch-auction tender offer; and 
• the open-market repurchase programme. 
In addition, there is a further method which is less commonly encountered and which is 
known as the "private purchase." 
The fixed-price tender offer involves the company offering a single price, usually at a 
premium, to all shareholders for a specific number of shares. The offer is valid for a 
specified period and mayor may not be contingent on a specified minimum number of 
shares being tendered. If the offer is oversubscribed, management has the option to 
increase the size of the repurchase (Comment and Jarrell, 1991). 
The Dutch-auction method also specifies the number of shares sought, but instead of a 
single offer price, this method specifies a range of prices within which each tendering 
shareholder chooses his minimum acceptable selling price. Each shareholder informs the 
offering firm of the number of shares which that shareholder is willing to sell and the 
minimum acceptable selling price within the range offered. The offering firm assembles 
all of these responses, orders them by the shareholders' minimum acceptable prices, and 
determines the lowest price that will fetch the number of shares sought. This price is then 
paid to all shareholders who tendered shares at a price equal to, or less than, the price as 
determined by the firm (Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
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The open-market method is the most commonly used method in the USA (Grullon and 
Ikenberry, 2000), and it involves companies, either directly or through intermediaries, 
buying their own stock on the open market. No premium is payable in the case of open-
market repurchases. 
The remaining category is the private purchase. Essentially, it involves a repurchase by 
the company from one or more specifically targeted shareholders on such terms as may 
be privately agreed between the parties. 
As we have already seen, 5 share repurchases are categorised somewhat differently in 
South Africa. All repurchases of shares by a company must be carried out pursuant to 
approvals given by special resolutions of the company in general meeting.6 The principal 
distinction made under the Companies Act is between approvals which are of a general 
nature and those which are of a specific nature.? The JSE Listing Requirements, which 
apply to listed shares, classify a purchase made pursuant to an approval of a general 
nature as a "general repurchase of securities" and a purchase made pursuant to a 
resolution of a specific nature as a "specific repurchase of securities". 8 The JSE Listing 
Requirements make a further distinction between two kinds of specific repurchases, 
namely, a specific repurchase involving a pro rata offer, "being an offer to all securities 
holders pro rata to their existing holdings,,,9 and (here the terminology becomes a little 
confusing) a specific repurchase involving a specific offer, "being an offer (to) 10 
securities holders specifically named".ll To sum up then, in South Africa we have: 
• general repurchases; 
• specific repurchases made with a pro rata offer, and 
5 See Chapter 2. 
6 Companies Act, 1973, s 85 (2): "Subject to the provisions of this section and any other applicable law, a 
company may by special resolution of the company, if authorised thereto by its articles, approve the 
acquisition of shares issued by the company." 
7 Companies Act, 1973, s 85(2): " The approval by special resolution may be a general approval or a 
specific approval for a particular acquisition" 
8 JSE Listing Requirements, par 5.67 
9 JSE Listing Requirements, par 5.69 
10 The relevant paragraph in the Listing Requirements reads "being an offer from securities holders ... "; 
~resumably this is an error, and it should read "being an offer to securities holders ... " 
I JSE Listing Requirements, par 5.69 
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• specific repurchases made with a specific offer. 12 
None of the methods employed for effecting repurchases in the USA has an exact 
counterpart in the methods employed in South Africa, inasmuch as the procedures, 
regulations and consequences for and of each method used in one country differ to a 
greater or lesser extent to those used in the other. Nonetheless, it may be said that the 
USA fixed-price tender offer corresponds most closely with the South African specific 
repurchase made with a pro rata offer. A series of repurchases made under a general 
authority in South Africa has its rough equivalent in the USA open-market programme. 
The third method provided for in South Africa, the specific offer, achieves much the 
same result as the private repurchase method in the USA. Only the Dutch-auction method 
of the USA appears to have no corresponding method in practice in South Africa, 
although in principle, there does not appear to be any prohibition on utilising a variation 
of the pro rata offer method to achieve a similar result to that of the Dutch-auction 
method. 
It is important to understand the various methods of repurchasing shares. As will be seen, 
a good deal of research has been conducted in the USA into the relative "signalling" 
effect that the method employed for a repurchase has on shareholder wealth, and reliance 
has been placed on the insights provided by that research for purposes of the present 
research. An understanding of the various methods and their consequences is therefore of 
considerable value for achieving an understanding of the effects of repurchases on 
shareholder wealth. 
Before considering those effects, it will be useful to examine the structural consequences 
that a repurchase has on a company, as these consequences in tum ultimately may have 
an effect on shareholder wealth. 
12 Somewhat confusingly, Daly (2001) states in page 2 that" Whereas in the US there are two broad types 
of share repurchase: the tender offer and the open-market repurchase, in South Africa the (Companies) Act 
and the JSE regulations essentially allow only for open market repurchases under a general authority." If 
this is intended to suggest that only one form of repurchase is permitted in South Africa, then it is 
respectfully submitted that this suggestion is wrong. 
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3.4 Structural Consequences 
A repurchase has been described as: 
"a redistribution of assets coupled with a reorganisation, In the form of a 
reduction, of a company's share capital, accomplished by means of a transfer of 
shares. But although a distribution, repurchase is not a device for putting income 
pro rata into the hands of shareholders on a continuing basis" (Blackman et ai, 
2002, P 5-43). 
The effect of a repurchase, unless it is related to a refinancing, is 
"to contract the size of the enterprise and to distribute assets to the selling 
stockholders. It is a form of partial liquidation" (Brudney and Bratton, 1993, 
P 609). 
In South Africa, if the shares are acquired directly by the issuing company, the shares 
must be cancelled. 13 In such a case, a repurchase of shares operates as a reduction of 
share capital (Blackman et ai, 2002) and the Companies Act specifically requires that 
issued capital be reduced accordingly. 14 In the United Kingdom, a similar situation 
prevails, and when shares are repurchased they must be treated as cancelled and the 
amount of the company's issued share capital must accordingly be diminished by the 
nominal value of those shares (Ferran, 1999). 
In the USA, the common practice is to treat repurchased shares as "treasury stock": they 
are shown as a negative value in the company's balance sheet (Brigham and Daves, 
2004), and, unlike the case of a repurchase by a company of its shares in South Africa, 
these treasury shares may be reissued. The concept of treasury shares is not expressly 
contemplated in the South African Companies Act; the Act does, however, permit a 
subsidiary to acquire up to 10% of the issued shares of its holding company (something 
13 Companies Act, 1973, s 85 (8): "Shares issued by a company and acquired under this section shall be 
cancelled as issued shares and restored to the status of authorised shares forthwith" 
14 Companies Act, 1973, s 85 (5): " In the case of the acquisition of par value shares issued by the company, 
the issued capital shall be decreased by an amount equal to the par value of the shares so acquired." S 85 (6) 
contains a corresponding provision applicable to no par value shares. 
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that was not permitted prior to the 1999 amendment to the Act).15 Such shares are not 
required to be cancelled as would be required in the case of a direct purchase by a 
company of its shares. They are in effect, although not technically, treasury shares 
(Blackman et ai, 2002) and the term "treasury shares" has now come to be commonly 
used to refer to such shares in South Africa. The JSE Listing Requirements have given 
regulatory weight to the use of the term to describe such shares. 16 It should be 
emphasised that the purchase of a company's shares by its subsidiary is, strictly speaking, 
not a repurchase as defined earlier in this chapter; nonetheless, a purchase of shares by a 
subsidiary is for most practical purposes treated as a repurchase. 17 
A final aspect which requires consideration is the relationship between repurchases and 
the capital maintenance rule. As was mentioned earlier, 18 one of the reasons offered for 
the prohibition against a company buying its own shares was that to do so would fly in 
the face of the capital maintenance rule; there is, however, "no necessary connection 
between permission to purchase and the abolition of the capital maintenance rule." 
(Blackman et ai, 2002, p 5-54) It is argued that the capital maintenance rule prohibits the 
return of funds without a formal reduction of the company's share capital. If a repurchase 
requires the cancellation of the repurchased shares (as is the case under the Companies 
Act) then such a repurchase would not constitute an abandonment of the capital 
maintenance rule, as the required cancellation constitutes a formal reduction of share 
capital (Blackman et ai, 2002). 
The effects of a repurchase on the structure of a company may, in summary, be said to be 
as follows: 
15 Companies Act, 1973, s 89: "Subsidiary companies may mutatis mutandis in accordance with sections 85, 
86 and 88, acquire shares in their holding company to a maximum of 10% in the aggregate of the number 
of issued shares of the holding company: Provided that this section shall not apply to the acquisition of 
shares by a holding company in a subsidiary of itself." 
16 JSE Listing Requirements, par. 5.75: "Whenever an issuer wishes to use repurchased shares, held as 
treasury securities by a subsidiary of the issuer, such use must comply with the Listing Requirements as if 
such use was a fresh issue of securities." 
17 JSE Listing Requirements par. 5.76: 'The requirements of paragraphs 5.67 to 5.84 (which set out the 
requirements relating to repurchases) also apply to purchases by a subsidiary of securities in its holding 
company ... " The term "buy-in" has occasionally been used to describe such a transaction, but it does not 
appear to have gained wide use. 
I See p 2. 
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• It transfers assets, usually in the form of cash, from the company to shareholders; 
• It either reduces the number of shares in issue, or, in the case of the purchase of 
shares by a subsidiary, it reduces the number of shares held by external 
shareholders. 
This in turn mayor may not increase the net asset value per share of the company, 
depending on the price paid for the repurchased shares, and all other things being equal, 
would increase the earnings per share of the company. 
Share repurchases having been placed in context, attention may now be turned to a 
discussion of the reasons for which a firm might repurchase shares, and the theories 
relating to the effect of repurchases on shareholder wealth. 
3.5 Theories and Reasons Explaining Share Repurchases 
Although share repurchases have become commonplace, it is open to question whether 
the reasons for carrying them out are fully understood. 19 
When the Companies Amendment Bill, 1999 (which became the Companies Amendment 
Act) was introduced, it was accompanied by an explanatory memorandum which 
purported to set out the reasons for which a company might repurchase its own shares. It 
is worthwhile quoting from this memorandum at length, as it tends to indicate that the 
introduction of repurchases into the law of South Africa was accompanied by some 
confusion: 
" ... our financial markets have lately entered into derivative activities on a large 
scale and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange USE) and SAFEX are rapidly 
becoming more complex and sophisticated. Markets have weakened considerably 
and this can be attributed to, inter alia, market manipulation by international banks 
and other speculators with unlimited financial resources. This factor alone poses a 
fundamental danger to our economy. 
19 Clark (1986), P 626 "It may be that public corporations rarely have a good reason for repurchasing their 
shares." 
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'There are inherent dangers in the impact of speculative derivative, futures and 
currency trading activities which are taking place in virtually all developed 
investment markets and now also in South Africa. These activities if taking place in 
an unscrupulous way (sic), can easily suppress the prices of shares on the stock 
market. South Africa has now become a magnet for profitable trading by these 
speculators. This has resulted in a decline in value of most leading South African 
shares. Acquiring control of sound companies through these methods could lead to 
significant job losses and businesses closing down due to asset stripping and other 
irregular activities. 
"One of the accepted and effective defences against this negative action In the 
international market place is the ability of strong companies to repurchase and 
cancel their own issued shares which levels the playing field in relation to those 
speculators wishing to reduce the value of the company's shares by indiscriminate 
market activities. Legislation in most of the EEe, USA and other developed 
markets permits the repurchase of a company's issued share capital, subject to 
solvency and liquidity criteria. 
"Allowing a company to acquire its own shares to support the market for its shares, 
thus also preserving for its shareholders the value of its shares, is but one advantage. 
There are several other advantages. It is particularly useful in relation to employee 
share schemes in enabling the shares of employees to be repurchased on their 
ceasing to be employed by the company; it provides a means to avert a hostile take-
over; it provides a means whereby a shareholder, or the estate of a deceased 
shareholder, in a company whose shares are not listed, can find a buyer. 
"The main argument against the power to acquire own shares is that it may be 
abused. Proper checks and balances are, however, being built into the proposed 
. . " 20 provlsIOns ... 
20 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Amendment Bill, 1999 
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Anyone reading this memorandum and hoping to gain insights into the reasons behind 
share repurchases would, no doubt, be sorely disappointed. If our legislators relied on this 
memorandum for guidance when voting the amendments into law, then it would seem 
that share repurchases in South Africa are permitted for a strange combination of reasons 
(some of which are trite, and others quite bizarre) namely, that repurchasing: 
• provides a means whereby a shareholder can find a buyer; 
• enables shares of employees to be bought when they leave the company; 
• provides a means of manipulating the market so as to avoid take-overs; and 
• can prevent job losses (Blackman et at, 2002). 
It is clear that the reasons contained in the memorandum are neither complete nor 
convincing and it is therefore necessary to look further afield to determine the reasons for 
share repurchases. 
In answer to the question, "Why, then, do some of our21 largest, most successful firms 
repurchase stock?" (Asquith and Mullins, 1986, p 33), it has been said that academics 
tend to favour three explanations. The first is the investor tax argument - repurchases are 
not perfect, but are an improvement on cash dividends. 22 The second is the leverage 
hypothesis, which holds that through repurchases of common stock, a firm can radically 
alter its capital structure, increase its debt ratio, and reap the benefits of higher leverage. 
The third is that repurchases are merely the recommendation by a vested interest group, 
namely, merchant bankers. It is, however, argued that many managers have a simpler 
answer. They buy back their stock because it is underpriced. In so doing, they convey 
valuable information to investors by providing a signal that those managers, who possess 
an insider's knowledge of the firm, are convinced that their stock is worth more than its 
current price. Furthermore, they are sufficiently convinced to pay a premium for stock 
despite the risk of dilution if they are wrong (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). 
21 For "our," read "the USA's." 
22 It must be emphasised that this comment refers to the situation in the USA and does not necessarily apply 
in other jurisdictions. 
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Intuition suggests that the reasons stated above are not the only ones which motivate 
share repurchases. Fortunately, there is a large body of writing which has contributed to 
an understanding of the reasons for which companies might repurchase their shares. 
Some of these reasons are mundane, and others are more complex. It should be kept in 
mind, however, that there is not necessarily a single dominant motive for companies to 
repurchase shares. In fact, in any particular company, there may be several factors which 
encourage the repurchasing of shares (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
A number of reasons have been considered by academics. The reasons discussed below 
are amongst those most commonly cited; it must be emphasised, however, that this list 
does not purport to be exhaustive. For purposes of the present discussion, these reasons 
have been grouped into five broad categories, which reflect, in general terms, the motives 
behind repurchases. These categories are: A. Repurchases relating to changes In 
shareholding and control; B. Repurchases carried out for administrative reasons; C. 
Repurchases as an element of dividend policy; D. Repurchases aimed at increasing share 
value; and E. Compensation-related repurchases. 
A. Repurchases relating to changes in shareholding and control 
This broad category is concerned with repurchases carried out with a View to 
changing, or preventing a change in, the shareholding (with or without an 
accompanying change in control) of the company, whether by introducing new 
shareholders, or by removing existing shareholders, or by changing the proportion 
in which shares are held. 
(i) Attracting external investors: 
If a company's shares are not actively traded, it is not an attractive investment 
prospect to external investors because of the risk of being permanently locked into 
that investment. This risk is lessened if the company is able to act as an alternative 
purchaser, in which case, smaller companies may find it easier to raise share capital 
from external sources than would otherwise be the case (Ferran, 1999). This reason 
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is more commonly cited in relation to private companies, but circumstances may 
exist where it is relevant to smaller listed companies. 
(ii) Exit for existing shareholders: 
Being able to sell the shares back to the company also offers a way of unlocking the 
investment made by a shareholder who no longer wishes to be involved in the 
company (Ferran 1999). This may be particularly useful when the other 
shareholders do not wish to acquire the withdrawing shareholder's shares 
themselves or there is no willing outside purchaser. Again, this reason is more 
usually cited in relation to private companies, but it may be relevant to listed 
companies as well. 23 Such a repurchase possibility provides a substitute for an 
active stock market (Blackman et ai, 2002). 
(iii) Buying out dissident shareholders: 
Repurchase provides a means by which a company can rid itself of a dissident 
shareholder (Blackman et ai, 2002). This could clearly lead to abuse (Ferran 1999), 
more particularly, in that management may be tempted to pay a considerable 
premium to persuade the dissident to go (Blackman et ai, 2002). This could be 
disadvantageous to remaining shareholders?4 
(iv) Repurchases to avoid a takeover: 
Any of a number of objectives might be achieved by repurchasing shares in a 
takeover situation. The repurchase may result in an increase in the proportion of 
shares owned by management. A repurchase might result in the increase in the price 
of shares beyond that which is attractive to the bidder. By embarking on a 
repurchase, the target company could divest itself of the liquid assets which make it 
attractive to the bidder, or increase its debt/equity ratio to an unattractive level. 
Finally, the company might resort to "greenmail", whereby it agrees to pay the 
23 See Appendix B for an example of this occurring in practice in a listed company. 
24 See Appendix B for an example of this occurring in practice. 
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bidder a substantial premIUm for his shares In order to induce him to tum his 
attention elsewhere (Blackman et ai, 2002)?5 
(v) Management buyouts and going private: 
Management buyouts and the process of "going private" can be facilitated by means 
of repurchases. The instigators of such transactions would seek to have the 
company repurchase shares and thereby reduce, at the company's expense, the 
number of shares in issue which they would have to acquire in order to gain control 
of the company. In the process, the liquidity of the outstanding shares might be 
reduced, thereby depressing the price of those shares and placing pressure on the 
remaining shareholders to sell (Blackman et ai, 2002)?6 
B. Repurchases Carried out for Administrative Reasons 
Included under this category are repurchases carried out for reasons other than 
strategic or financial, that is to say, for purposes of facilitating administration of the 
company. 
(i) Allowing a listed company to acquire small shareholdings, such as odd-lots: 
Interestingly, this rather mundane reason is one of the most frequently used In 
specific repurchases in South Africa. Odd-lots are expensive and inconvenient for 
companies to administer. Prior to repurchases being permitted in South Africa, a 
company could deal with odd-lots only by matching would-be sellers of odd-lots 
with would-be purchasers. Companies can now sweep up odd-lots through the 
h h · 27 repurc ase mec amsm. 
2S See also Brudney and Bratton (1993) for a discussion of "greenmail." 
26 'The process, which proceeds according to terms unilaterally fixed by management (e.g. price) under 
circumstances which invite overreaching, thus results in a substantial correction of the outstanding shares 
of the enterprise, either leaving a small disadvantaged public constituency holding shares for which there is 
only a thin market or totally eliminating public holdings of the shares. In either event, shareholders are 
effectively frozen out, and insiders remain the owners of the enterprise, either wholly or in large part." 
(Blackman et at (2002), p 5-61). 
27 As odd-lot acquisitions are merely administrative actions and hardly qualify as examples of grand 
corporate strategy, they are not included in the study of reasons for repurchases in South Africa in Chapters 
5 and 6. Suffice it to mention that in addition to the 55 repurchases included in that study, 14 repurchases 
where identified as being carried out for purposes of sweeping up odd-lots. 
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(ii) Repurchases for use in acquisition programmes: 
A company engaging in a takeover or merger might repurchase shares and then 
reissue28 them as consideration for a takeover or merger without increasing the 
number of shares in issue. The objective would be to prevent dilution of the equity 
of non-selling shareholders which would otherwise occur if fresh shares were to be 
issued (Blackman et ai, 2002). 
(iii) Enabling a company to trade in its own shares~ 
"It is generally accepted that trafficking by a company 10 its own shares is an 
unmitigated evil which should be prohibited in absolute terms."(Blackman et ai, 
2002, p5-51). If repurchased shares are not cancelled but retained as treasury shares, 
then it is notionally possible that a company may well trade in its shares. In South 
Africa, treasury shares, strictly speaking, are not recognised, but shares may be 
acquired by a company's subsidiary, and such shares are for practical purposes the 
equivalent of treasury shares. 
(iv) Repurchase of redeemable shares: 
If redeemable shares are trading at a discount to their redemption price, a company 
may repurchase those shares at a price lower than the redemption price and thereby 
save money (Ferran, 1999). Another reason that has been suggested for repurchasing 
redeemable shares departs from a contrary viewpoint - it might reduce the 
temptation for a company to redeem under a fonnal reduction scheme when the 
existence of such shares becomes onerous for the company because of a change in 
interest rates; the repurchasing of the shares may be viewed as preferable to a 
reduction scheme as it might be viewed as less coercive (Blackman et ai, 2002). 
28 At the risk of appearing repetitive, it is again pointed out that this result would be achieved in South 
Africa by means of a repurchase of shares by a subsidiary. 
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C. Repurchases as an Element of Dividend Policy 
This category is concerned with repurchases which are carried out for purposes of 
dividend policy by returning wealth, represented by surplus capital, to shareholders. 
As has been previously pointed out,29 a repurchase is not the same as a dividend, 
but rather an alternative to a dividend; the term "dividend policy" is therefore used 
in its broadest sense in the present context. 
(i) Distribution of surplus assets: 
Repurchasing shares is a method of returning to shareholders surplus cash that the 
company is unable to invest in projects that will generate a return greater than its 
cost of capital (Ferran, 1999). If a company lacks internal investing opportunities 
and has cash surplus to its ordinary requirements, then the excess can be employed 
to shrink the equity base through the repurchase of shares (Brudney and Bratton, 
1993, and Blackman et ai, 2002). Shareholders will then be at liberty to invest the 
proceeds as they deem fit. 
An issue of critical concern is whether managers work to increase shareholder 
wealth by always making decisions that increase the value of the firm (Grullon and 
Ikenberry, 2000). With the separation of ownership and control of enterprises, 
managers have acquired a greater ability to put their own interests ahead of their 
shareholders. This gives rise to the concern that managers might allocate capital 
into unprofitable activities, pursuing growth and size rather than profitability and 
value. The costs that arise from this conflict between growth and value 
maximisation are known in finance theory as "agency costs," or more precisely, as 
the "agency costs of free cash flow" (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000; Grullon and 
Michaely, 2004). It has been argued that one way to at least mitigate such free cash 
flow problems is to return cash to shareholders in the form of increased dividends 
(Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). Share repurchases can achieve the same effect. The 
free cash flow hypothesis maintains that by paying out free cash flow, share 
repurchases represent good news and add value by curbing management's tendency 
29 See p 26. 
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to waste it on low-return investments (Gup and Nam, 2001). It has been said that 
any repurchase can be a good repurchase, provided it does not jeopardise the firm's 
ability to fund promising investment opportunities that might arise in the future 
(Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
Related to the free cash flow hypothesis is the capital market allocation hypothesis. 
It differs in that it asserts that even without agency problems, shareholders are 
better off with a share repurchase programme. The reason for this, or so the theory 
goes, is that shareholders can allocate funds more effectively than corporate 
managers, if only because they have a broader view of economy-wide opportunities 
(Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
Since a corporation can pay dividends under the same circumstances, why is the 
power to pay dividends not enough for fulfilment of these dividend-type functions? 
It has been suggested that a repurchase allows those shareholders who prefer a cash 
flow to sell some of their shares, while allowing those who prefer a low payout 
investment 
"to stand pat; therefore shareholders will be better satisfied. But this 
argument neglects the fact that it is quite unnecessary for any particular 
corporation to be all things to all types of shareholders. Investors who want 
high yielding stocks can and do invest in companies with high dividend 
payout ratios, and investors who want low yielding stocks do the opposite" 
(Clark, 1986, p 627). 
The question then arises as to why there should be any concern about this choice. 
"If, for whatever reason, a corporation wants to make distributions and can do so 
via dividends or repurchases, why worry if it arbitrarily chooses the latter?"(Clark, 
1986, p 627). The reason for concern is that repurchases have a greater potential for 
creating unequal treatment of shareholders of the same class. If a company pays too 
much for its shares in a repurchase, the remaining shareholders will be 
disadvantaged; if it pays too little, the selling shareholders will be disadvantaged. 
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When dividends are paid, however, every shareholder receives the same amount per 
share (Clark, 1986). 
It is also possible that repurchases serve as a substitute for dividends in that they 
provide an alternative means of distributing large, non-recurring cash flows as 
opposed to recurring earnings which are generally expected to be paid out regularly 
in the form of dividends over time (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000).30 
(ii) Dividend substitution for tax purposes: 
In the USA, before share repurchases became popular in the 1980's, cash dividends 
were the principal means of returning excess capital to shareholders (Grullon and 
Ikenberry, 2000). In South Africa, prior to the 1999 amendments to the Companies 
Act, dividends were the only means of doing so, apart from reductions in capital 
permitted only in very specific circumstances.3! 
As we have seen, in the USA, share repurchases at one point overtook dividends as 
a means of distributing funds. 32 It has been suggested that in the USA, the increase 
in repurchase activity is a reflection, in part, of a broad tax-motivated substitution of 
repurchases for dividends (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). An exhaustive study (Lie 
and Lie, 1999) has found that tax considerations do playa significant role in the 
USA in the choice between a repurchase and a dividend, and that pressure from 
institutional investors to take advantage of tax benefits is a factor in this choice.33 
The reason for this is that in the USA, repurchases generally constitute a more tax-
efficient form of distribution than do dividends. The marginal tax rate on dividends, 
which are taxed as ordinary income, exceeds that on realized capital gains; the full 
amount of dividend income is taxed as ordinary income, whereas only the portion 
30 In South Africa, companies have yet another choice, namely, to make payments in terms of s 90 of the 
Companies Act. 
31 See footnote lOon p 3 for a discussion of reductions in capital prior to the 1999 amendments to the 
Companies Act. 
32 See Chapter 1 above. 
33 Compare this study, however, with a study conducted in 1969 referred to by Vermaelen (198\) which 
found that in a survey of 609 firms repurchasing their shares, managers were able to come up with no less 
than 29 different reasons to repurchase shares, none of them related to personal or corporate tax savings. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
42 
of the proceeds from a stock sale that constitutes a realised capital gain is taxed; and 
dividends are taxable when distributed, whereas taxes on capital gains are deferred 
until the stock is sold (Bartov et aI, 1998)?4 It must be kept in mind, however, that 
the tax regime in South Africa is very different from that in the USA, and the 
considerations which apply in the USA need not necessarily apply also in South 
Africa35- or in other jurisdictions, for that matter. 
D. Repurchases Aimed at Increasing Share Value 
This category includes share repurchases which, in one way or another, and whether 
expressly or impliedly, are aimed at increasing the value of the shares of the 
company. 
(i) Repurchase as a "good investment": 
A repurchase may be made ostensibly to take advantage of a perceived 
undervaluation to make a "good investment" for the benefit of shareholders. This 
has been dismissed as a "form of doubletalk," because "after the repurchase, the 
funds used for it will no longer be in the corporation, or invested in its real business 
operations" (Clark, 1986, p 630).36 If the managers are right about the market's 
undervaluation, the repurchase serves only to 
"shift wealth from the shareholders who sell to those who don't. Perhaps 
managers see this as a division between investors who lack faith in them and 
34In the USA, if a company makes regular repurchases of shares, the shareholders run the risk of having the 
proceeds of those repurchases treated as dividends. "Therefore, in the public corporation context the 
occasions for tax-motivated repurchases are real but limited." (Clark, 1986,625) 
35 In South Africa, the proceeds of share repurchases are (in very general terms) treated as dividends. 
Section 1 of the Income Tax Act, 1962, defines dividends as 
"any amount distributed by a company ... to its shareholders ... and "amount distributed" includes ... 
(c) in the event of a partial reduction or redemption of the capital of a company, including the 
acquisition of shares in terms of Section 85 of the Companies Act ... so much of the sum of any 
cash ... as exceeds the cash equivalent of-
(i) the amount by which the nominal value of the shares of that shareholder is reduced; or 
(ii) the nominal value of the shares so acquired from such shareholder. .. " 
As a general rule, dividends are not taxable in the hands of recipients, but the distributing company is liable 
to pay Secondary Tax on Companies under s 64B of the Income Tax Act. The treatment of repurchase 
proceeds as dividends is subject to certain important exceptions - see for example, proviso (iii) to the 
definition of "dividends" in section 1. The recipient of the proceeds may, however, be liable for Capital 
Gains Tax as provided for in the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
36 Clark (p 631) also describes this reason as "nonsensical and suspect." 
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those who have it and consequently think the repurchase is a fine method of 
punishing the doubters and rewarding the faithful. But it hardly seems 
appropriate for managers to be doing this. Shareholders who have more faith 
in the company's future are perfectly able to buy additional shares ... without 
management's help" (Clark, 1986, p 630).37 
(ii) Repurchases to support the market for the company's shares: 
A company may wish to repurchase its shares in order to bolster or stabilise the 
market price (Ferran, 1999). Such conduct does, however, give rise to concerns 
about market manipulation, which is considered a most serious consequence of 
recognising a right in companies to purchase their own shares. "At best, a company 
may seek to affect the market for its shares because it believes its shares to be 
'undervalued'" (Blackman et ai, 2002, p 5-56). 
Related to repurchasing for the sake of supporting the market for the company's 
shares is the question of signalling. This is often treated as a separate reason for 
repurchasing, but it is submitted that support for market and signalling are so 
closely related that they are best treated as being different aspects of the same 
reason. The two can be conveniently combined by stating that market repurchases 
act as a signal to the market that management is confident that the shares will 
increase in value. The question of signalling support for the market is discussed in 
somewhat exhaustive detail elsewhere.38 
(iii) Capital structure adjustments: 
A company might repurchase its shares in order to adjust its debt-to-equity ratio 
(Blackman et ai, 2002; Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). Such a course of action 
would be based on the assumption that the company can reduce its overall cost of 
capital through the use of debt in the capital structure (Brudney and Bratton, 1993). 
37 Clark (1983), also at p 630: "Indeed, by raising the demand for the corporation's shares, the repurchase 
offer will induce some shareholders to sell who otherwise would have stood pat, and under management's 
own theory of undervaluation, would have participated in the company's bright but unappreciated future." 
See also Blackman et ai, 2002. 
3H See Chapter 4 below. 
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A company whose capital structure is relatively heavily weighted with equity can 
lower its cost of capital by incurring debt and using the proceeds to repurchase 
shares (Brudney and Bratton, 1993; Blackman et ai, 2002). Several studies in the 
USA have found that repurchasing firms do in fact experience a decline in the cost 
of capital (Grullon and Michaely, 2004). 
Repurchases may be used to produce large-scale changes in capital structure 
(Brigham and Daves, 2004) or to fine-tune their leverage over time (Grullon and 
Ikenberry, 2000). It has been suggested that in the USA, the tender offer method of 
repurchase is most commonly used in order to achieve large scale changes, as 
typically, large proportions of shares are repurchased under that method. Open 
market repurchase programmes, on the other hand, are better suited to the latter 
objective (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
But this reason is also not without its doubters. It has been pointed out that in the 
USA, under most state statutes, the directors of a company can reduce capital by 
following a voting procedure (Clark, 1986). In South Africa, at the same time that 
the Companies Act was amended to allow share repurchases, Section 90 39 was 
amended to permit a company to make payments to its shareholders, if authorised 
thereto by its articles. This would have the same effect as a repurchase as far as 
reducing capital is concerned, and it must therefore be questioned why a South 
African company would wish to follow the repurchase route to reduce capital when 
the somewhat less onerous procedure provided by Section 90 is available.4o 
E. Compensation-related Reasons 
Repurchases may be carried out in order to facilitate or implement share-based 
compensation schemes. 
39. The mechanism provided by this section has not infrequently been used as a means of distributing assets 
to shareholders. The making of payments under this section as opposed to paying dividends or making 
repurchases may prove to be a fruitful topic for research. 
40 It is worth noting in passing that in the analysis of reasons for repurchases which forms part of this study, 
reducing the cost of capital was cited as a reason for repurchasing in South Africa in only one case. 
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(i) Repurchases for use in stock plans: 
Share repurchasing is also said to be prompted by the company's obligation to issue 
shares under employee stock option plans. The ostensible purpose is again to avoid 
dilution of shareholders' equity (Blackman et ai, 2002). Whether this objective is 
achieved is open to question. Whilst the number of shares in issue remains the same, 
the shareholders will still bear the cost of the employees' options: the option holders 
pay less for their shares than the company pays when repurchasing, and therefore 
the repurchase will involve a net distribution of assets. 
(ii) Employee share schemes: 
An advantage which has been claimed for allowing repurchases is that this can 
facilitate the operation of an employee share scheme by assuring employees of a 
purchaser for their shares when they leave the company (Ferran, 1999). Whether 
this is a serious issue is open to question (Blackman et ai, 2002), as employee share 
schemes are generally operated through trusts which would purchase shares upon 
the departure of an employee.41 
(iii) Management compensation: 
Companies often use stock options and stock appreciation rights as part of the 
compensation plans for key employees. Unlike share repurchases, which have no 
effect on the value of these options, dividend payments reduce their value (Bartov 
et ai, 1998). Consequently, the fact that managers own stock options may be an 
inducement for them to distribute cash through open-market repurchase programs 
rather than through dividends (Bartov et ai, 1998). 
As can be seen, the reasons for which a company might decide to repurchase its shares 
are many and varied. Some reasons are plausible, whilst others are less so. Some have 
laudable objectives, whilst others have dubious aims which verge on the illegal. Some are 
41 The power of a company to repurchase its own shares has, however, proved useful in practice in relation 
to employee share schemes, albeit from a different perspective - see footnote 17 on page 75 below. 
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logical, others make little sense; and, as has been shown above, many are subject to some 
trenchant criticism.42 
No recent USA study indicating the frequency with which particular reasons are offered 
for repurchases could be found. It seems, however, that the reason which has attracted the 
greatest interest in academic circles relates to that of signalling in order to indicate 
confidence in the company and hence support the market for its shares. This aspect - both 
insofar as it relates to the reason and to the effect - forms, as will be seen, a cornerstone 
of this study, and is of particular interest for present purposes. It will therefore be 
considered at length in the next chapter, in which the effects of repurchases on 
shareholder wealth are examined. 
3.6 South African Literature 
The literature discussed thus far in this review has emanated almost exclusively from the 
USA. South Africa has produced very little published work on repurchases. Surprisingly, 
the most comprehensive work consulted was the work on company law by Blackman et 
ai, which has been referred to fairly extensively. No studies published in local academic 
financial journals could be located, although occasional articles have been published in 
the commercial daily and weekly financial press. Only three dissertations on the topic 
could be identified. These were: 
42 Warren Buffett, in his 1999 Letter to Shareholders, offered the following views on repurchases: "There is 
only one combination of facts that makes it advisable for a company to repurchase its shares. First, the 
company has available funds--cash plus sensible borrowing capacity--beyond the near-term needs of the 
business and, second, finds its stock selling in the market below its intrinsic value .. .To this we add a caveat: 
Shareholders should have been supplied all the information they need for estimating that value. Otherwise, 
insiders could take advantage of their uninformed partners and buyout their interests at a fraction of true 
worth ... The business 'needs' that I speak of are of two kinds. First, expenditures that a company must 
make to maintain its competitive position ... and, second, optional outlays, aimed at business growth, that 
management expects will produce more than a dollar of value for each dollar spent. .. Now, repurchases are 
all the rage, but are all too often made for an unstated, and in our opinion, ignoble reason: to pump up or 
support the stock price. The shareholder who chooses to sell today, of course, is benefited by any buyer, 
whatever his origin or motives. But the continuing shareholder is penalized by repurchases above intrinsic 
value. Buying dollar bills for $1.10 is not good business for those who stick around ... it appears to us that 
many companies making repurchases are overpaying departing shareholders at the expense of those who 
stay ... I can't help but feel that too often today's repurchases are dictated by management's desire to 'show 
confidence' or be in fashion rather than by a desire to enhance per-share value." 
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• N Olsha Share Buy-Backs: A Comparative Analysis School of Law, University of 
the Witwatersrand, 2002; 
• 1M Rabinowitz Share Buybacks: A South African Perspective, Faculty of 
Commerce, University of the Witwatersrand, 1999; 
• KJ Daly Share Returns of Companies Announcing Share Repurchases under a 
General Authority School of Business, University of the Witwatersrand, 2002. 
Of these three works, only those by Rabinowitz and Daly could be located through the 
University Inter-library Loan Service. 
The dissertation by Rabinowitz was produced before the amendments to the Companies 
Act discussed in the preceding chapter came into force. It provides, amongst other things, 
an interesting analysis of theory, a comparative analysis of regulatory provisions in 
various countries and a critical analysis of the then new and not yet in force South 
African legislation. It concludes that "South Africa is expected to benefit considerably 
from the long awaited introduction of Share Repurchases." (Rabinowitz, 1999, pIli) 
The dissertation by Daly appears to be the first and only work involving an empirical 
analysis of share repurchases in South Africa. It too provided an intensive analysis of 
theory and focused on what are termed "open market" repurchases made in South Africa 
from June 1999 to September 200 I and found that there was no significant market 
reaction to the announcement of repurchases. This conclusion is of particular interest 
given the findings regarding open-market repurchases in the USA.43 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter has, by reference to existing literature, placed the notion of share 
repurchases in context. In the course of so doing, it has provided a definition of 
repurchases, considered the various types of repurchases and the consequences thereof. In 
addition, it has examined the reasons which are generally offered to justify repurchases 
43 See Chapter 4 below. 
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and also the theoretical effect of repurchases on shareholder wealth. It has considered the 
regulatory environment pertaining to repurchases, with particular reference to the 
situation in South Africa. Finally, it has considered the literature on the topic produced in 
South Africa. 
The following principal insights emerge from this chapter: 
• A repurchase is a particular method of returning assets to investors, similar in 
some respects to dividends and other methods, but distinct nonetheless, with its 
own rules, objecti ves and effects; 
• In both the USA and South Africa, various methods of repurchase are recognised; 
the particular methods employed in South Africa bear similarities to those 
employed in the USA, yet each country has its own rules and conventions; 
• The structural effect of a repurchase on a company is that of a redistribution of 
assets and a partial liquidation; 
• A firm may repurchase its shares for any of a number of reasons; 
• The reason which appears to be most favoured in the USA, however, is that a 
repurchase is intended to support or improve the company's share price. 
These conclusions provide the framework for the empirical research referred to in later 
chapters relating to share repurchases in South Africa. These chapters concern 
respectively the methodology employed in the research, the findings relating to the 
reasons for repurchases, and the findings relating to the effects of repurchases on 
shareholder wealth.44 
44 Chapters 5 and 6 
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Chapter 4 
The Effect of Repurchases on Shareholder Value: Theory 
4.1 Introduction 
The various methods of effecting repurchases in the USA - tender-offer repurchases, 
Dutch-auction repurchases, open-market repurchases and private purchases - have been 
referred to previously.l Various studies, which are discussed in more detail below, have 
shown that significant positive abnormal returns are associated with the announcements 
of repurchases under each of the three principal (i.e. the first three) methods. The increase 
in the share price is usually interpreted as support for the signalling hypothesis, which 
holds that firms buy back their shares when managers have private information that those 
shares are underpriced. As we have seen, the signalling hypothesis is but one of the 
reasons for which a company might repurchase its shares. It is, however, probably the 
reason which has undergone the deepest scrutiny from academic writers, is widely 
regarded by academics as the explanation for the increase in intrinsic firm value that 
accompanies self-tender offers, and is frequently cited by management as the principal 
reason for carrying out a repurchase (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). 
Information signalling was identified in two separate studies published in 1981 as the 
main motivation for self-tender offers in the USA. One such study (Dann, 1981), 
examined the effects of a common stock repurchase on the value of the firm's stock and 
debt, and attempted to identify the dominant factors underlying the observed value 
changes. The evidence indicated that significant increases in firm values occurred within 
one day of a stock repurchase announcement, and these were due principally to an 
information signal from the firm. The other study published in that year (Vermaelen, 
1981) examined the pricing behaviour of securities of firms following repurchases. The 
results were held to be consistent with the hypothesis that firms offer premiums for their 
I See Chapter 3 
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shares mainly in order to signal positive information, and that the market uses the 
premium, the target fraction and the fraction of insider holdings as signals in order to 
price securities around the announcement date. 
Since then, this signalling explanation has been accepted among academics (Asquith and 
Mullins, 1986; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; McNally,1998) and has been the subject of 
several other studies. As will be seen,2 however, the results of these studies are not 
always consistent with each other and it seems that the matter is not yet entirely settled. 
In essence, the signalling hypothesis holds that only a management confident of its 
company's prospects would volunteer to buy back its own shares at a premium over the 
market value (McNally, 1998). 
4.2 An Examination of Various Studies 
Vermaelen's study referred to above found that in a sample of 131 tender offers in the 
USA, the average premium was 23% and on average, 15% of the firm's outstanding 
shares were repurchased. The Cumulative Abnormal Return method3 was used to analyse 
the sample. It was found that the abnormal return during the announcement period 
averaged roughly 17%. As the offers expired during the succeeding weeks, the stocks 
sold off by only about 4%, and there was no additional decline in Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns for at least a year. It was concluded that the remaining gain of 13% was 
permanent. It will be recalled that in the case of tender offers, a firm offers to purchase its 
stock at a specified price, usually at a premium to the market price. 
In Vermaelen's analysis of the underlying causes of these gains, the tax advantage of 
repurchases over dividends was rejected as a cause. The market reaction was attributed to 
an information effect, rather than any leverage hypothesis, and it was argued that the 
repurchase convinces investors that the stock was undervalued prior to the tender offer. In 
2 See p 55 below. 
3 This method is discussed in some detail in Chapter 5 below. 
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this study, it was argued that if the managers have no positive inside information, 
repurchasing shares at a premium above their true value will hurt the non-tendering 
shareholders, or rather, the shareholders who are holding the shares when the 'true' value 
of information becomes publicly available. 
In short, it was argued that the effectiveness of a repurchase as a signal would depend on 
the size of the shareholdings of inside managers (the greater their holding, the more 
effective the signal), the size of the premium over the pre-offer market price, and the 
proportion of the shares sought in the offer. This is consistent with a signalling 
explanation.4 The reasoning is that managers can possess superior information about the 
future prospects of the company. A share repurchase would allow owner-managers to bet 
on these prospects. The most convincing bets are seen as arising in those situations where 
managers have the most financial risk of false signalling (Comment and Jarrell, 1991). 
False signalling occurs when a premium is announced which significantly exceeds the 
amount by which the share is undervalued. False signalling would be costly to a non-
tendering inside manager because the offer constitutes a dividend to tendering 
shareholders, at the expense of the non-tendering shareholders, to the extent that the 
market price falls short of the offer price after the announcement (Comment and Jarrell, 
1991). In the USA, managers generally pre-commit to refrain from tendering, and if they 
were to signal falsely, they would be disadvantaged in that their personal wealth would 
be reduced (McNally, 1998). By committing not to tender, managers impose upon 
themselves the risk that the offer will constitute an effective dividend resulting in the loss 
of personal wealth. The existence of this risk to managers makes the tender far more 
credible as a signal (Comment and Jarrell, 1991). 
Vermaelen's study also examined a sample of 234 open-market announcements. In this 
sample, the firms had been experiencing negative abnormal share priee performance prior 
to the repurchase, having underperformed the market by about 7% during the preceding 
three months. The repurchases produced a gain of about 3%, and prices retreated about 
1 % during the succeeding three months, resulting in an apparently permanent gain of 2%. 
4 See also Asquith and Mullins (1986). 
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It will be recalled 5 that unlike tender offers, open-market repurchases are conducted 
through brokers at normal commission rates and no premium is paid. The significance of 
the absence of a premium is that a different model must be found to explain the 
effectiveness of signalling in open market repurchase programmes. Vermaelen suggests 
that the explanation is to be found in the fact that, because firms predominantly reissued 
shares to insiders via stock options, the repurchase would have been perceived as a 
transfer of stock from outsiders to insiders, something which would be consistent with a 
signal of confidence in the firm. 
It is reasonable to conclude from this study that open-market repurchases are less 
powerful as signals than tender offers (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). Even so, both 
methods of repurchase were found to be advantageous to shareholders (Asquith and 
Mullins, 1986).6 In both cases, the reasoning is that if managers believe that their shares 
are underpriced, a repurchase communicates their conviction to shareholders. It is backed 
by cash or securities, and, for tender offers, the willingness to pay a premium above the 
current price (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). 
The other study published in 1981, by Dann, found that 
"overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that repurchase tender offer 
announcements constitute a revelation by management of favourable new 
information about the value of the firm's future prospects [but that] the specific 
nature of the information conveyed to investors by means of the repurchase 
announcement is not readily apparent. Careful scrutiny of the rationale for 
repurchase proffered by management at the announcement fails to uncover concrete 
disclosures regarding improvements in the distribution of the firm's cash flows." 
(Dann, 1981, ppI36-137). 
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the findings of these two studies are 
not quite consistent with the findings of a study published in 1980 (Masulis, 1980), which 
5 See Chapter 3 above. 
6 A later study found that the information conveyed by open-market share repurchases is largely ignored; 
see Ikenberry et aI, 1995 p 184. 
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found that announcements of tender offers are associated with dramatic returns, but 
ascribed this phenomenon to: 
• marginal personal tax advantages of converting di vidends into gains; 
• corporate tax benefits of financing stock repurchases with debt; 
• inter-security class wealth transfers; and 
• wealth transfers between tendering and non-tendering shareholders. 
A later study in 1991 by Comment and Jarrel (which has been previously referred to) 
examined repurchases carried out in the USA from 1984 to 1989. The study examined 
1197 open-market repurchases and 165 self-tender offers. Of the self-tender offers, 72 
were of the Dutch-auction variety. The period selected for this study is significant 
because it appears that Dutch auctions became a common means of effecting repurchases 
only from 1984 (McNally, 1998), in other words, after the period covered by the earlier 
studies. In addition, the period coincides with a period of intense repurchase activity in 
the USA which commenced in 1984. This study found that fixed-price self-tender offers 
resulted in an average excess return of about 11 %, Dutch auctions resulted in excess 
returns of under 8%, and open-market repurchase programmes produced excess returns of 
about 2%. It was concluded that the fact that Dutch auctions produced lower returns than 
fixed-price tenders is consistent with the signalling-based hypothesis that Dutch auctions 
are less effective as signals of stock undervaluation. 
It was also concluded by Comment and Jarrell (1991) that the reason for Dutch auctions 
being less effective as signals is that they typically expose owner-managers to less risk 
than fixed-price offers. It will be recalled7 that in a Dutch-auction repurchase, offers 
within a range of prices are elicited from shareholders - in other words, the price is 
determined by the market, whilst in the case of other fixed-price tenders, managers are 
forced to 'stick their necks out,' something which is taken as lending more credibility to 
7 See Chapter 3 above. 
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the signal. In short, the price increase from buyback announcements was greater when 
personal wealth was at risk and was unrelated to prior market returns.8 
The study also found that Dutch auctions reduce the premium actually paid by about one-
third compared to fixed-price offers. Finally, it was found that although open-market 
repurchases were associated with the lowest returns, a sub-sample of open-market 
repurchases in which more than 20% of the outstanding shares were purchased showed 
excess returns of about 6%, which is not far from the average for Dutch auction 
repurchases. This suggests that even if no premium is offered, the size of the offer can 
influence the returns on the share. 
It was concluded that 
"Overall, this study provides broad support for the theory that buybacks increase 
stock prices because they are credible managerial signals that the offering firm's 
stock is undervalued .. .In addition, this study shows that signalling theory provides 
a unique explanation for some of the observed economic effects of stock 
buybacks ... " (Comment and Jarrell, 1991, p 1266).9 
These studies were supported by later studies. A paper by Ikenberry et al (1995) 
examined the long-run performance following open-market repurchase announcements 
and found that the long-term abnormal returns were substantial and sustained. A paper 
published in 2000 by Grullon and Ikenberry examined the reasons for repurchases and 
8 A separate study by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) found, however, that share repurchases were 
negatively related to prior stock performance, suggesting that firms increase their purchasing depending on 
the degree of perceived undervaluation. 
9 It was, however, pointed out that "the results do not rule out an important role being played by other 
theories in explaining the motivation for and effects of stock buybacks ... Moreover, our study and others 
show that the bulk of buyback activity is conducted through open-market repurchase programs and Dutch-
auction self-tender offers, methods which have less signalling effectiveness than the conventional fixed-
price offer. This suggests that most stock buyback activity may be principally motivated by objectives other 
than (or in addition to) signalling stock undervaluation, such as (distributing) excess cash to shareholders in 
a tax-efficient manner, reducing the threat of hostile stock acquisitions, or other firm-specific explanations. 
Nevertheless, the signalling theory enjoys the greatest success to date at explaining the differences in the 
typical stock-price response to various methods of corporate stock repurchase" (Comment and Jarrell, 1991, 
pp1266 - 1267). 
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found that the signalling theory was amongst the foremost reasons, but pointed out that 
any number of reasons might be advanced. 
As was mentioned above, however, the results of not all studies are consistent with each 
otheLlO A study conducted by Grullon and Ikenberry in 2000 argued that there are, in fact, 
two different versions of the signalling theory. One version holds that repurchases are 
intended to convey management's expectation of future increases in the firm's earnings 
and cash flow, a view that is not shared by the market. The other version maintains that 
managers are not attempting to convey new information to the market, but are instead 
expressing their disagreement with how the market is pricing their current performance. 
In either case, the stock is viewed by management as being undervalued. The 
disagreement between the two versions centres on the cause of the discrepancy between 
price and fair value. In the first case, the cause is seen as being the company's inability 
(in the absence of a repurchase) to communicate its prospects convincingly to the market; 
in the second case, it is the failure of the market to reflect publicly available information 
in the current price (Ikenberry et aI, 1995). 
According to the first version, managers are willing to commit themselves to making cash 
outflows in the form of repurchases if they expect that increased future earnings will 
finance future capital needs. On the other hand, companies anticipating decreased 
earnings are not as likely to allow such cash outflows because to do so might not only 
force them to forego profitable investments, but might also give rise to financial distress 
(Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
This version implies that repurchasing firms should on average experience increases in 
future earnings and cash flows; the empirical evidence, however, is not so unequivocal. 
Whilst early studies found evidence of improved earnings following announcements of 
repurchases, they focussed on fixed-price repurchases, in which the willingness to pay a 
fixed premium made a more powerful statement to the market. In cases where managers 
made open-market repurchases, however, the evidence that increases in profits were 
10 See p 50 above. 
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anticipated is less supportive; in fact, a recent study indicates that in such cases, operating 
income declines as a percentage of total assets (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
The second version maintains that managers are signalling their disagreement with how 
the market is pricing existing public information. It may well be that managers are in a 
better position than others to recognise when market prices of shares do not reflect their 
true value. But according to the study carried out by Grullon and Ikenberry in 2000 the 
initial market reaction to open market repurchases is generally about 4%,11 which would 
appear to be small if the shares were such a bargain. It was concluded that either many 
companies announcing repurchases were not so undervalued or the market was somewhat 
sceptical of managements' claims (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
In passing, it is worth noting that a separate study (by D'Mello and Shroff, 2000) found 
that 74% of repurchasing firms are in fact undervalued prior to the repurchase compared 
to 51 % of a control sample of non-purchasing firms, and that the magnitude of 
undervaluation is significantly higher for the repurchasing firms relative to the non-
repurchasing firms. 
4.3 Criticisms of the Signalling Hypothesis 
The notion that a company's share price can be supported by signalling is not without its 
detractors elsewhere. Blackman et al (2002) offer the criticism 12 that this notion is based 
on three assumptions which need not necessarily hold true. First, it assumes that 
management's bona fide belief that the market for the company's shares does not reflect 
their true value is an acceptable indicator of undervaluation; it is argued, however, that 
managers are poorly placed to value the shares of the own company because they are 
inherently biased, since any valuation inevitably involves and assessment of their own 
II As opposed to about 15% for fixed-price offers (See Grullon and Ikenberry 2000, p 37). 
12 It is interesting to note that some of the most trenchant criticism of the theory of signalling emerges from 
the legal fraternity, rather than financial academics. The criticism discussed here emanates from Blackman 
et al and other legal sources referred to in their work. It may be that viewing the matter from the 
perspective of a different discipline lends objectivity to the analysis which might not be forthcoming from 
financial circles. Perhaps the question of intra-disciplinary "conditioning" to accept conventional wisdom 
(e.g. that a repurchase signals good news) might make a worthwhile subject for research' 
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performance. Second, it assumes that such repurchases constitute a signal by persons who 
know the true value of the company's shares. It is highly improbable, however, that 
repurchasing can ever constitute such a signal, since it is not an ordinary purchase. Rather, 
it is a distribution of corporate assets, and there is no obvious reason why a distribution in 
the form of a repurchase should indicate to the market that the company is confident that 
its shares are undervalued. Repurchases by a company may reveal a number of things 
about a company, e.g. that it is overcapitalised, but they will not in themselves constitute 
a signal that the company believes its shares to be undervalued. Third, it assumes that the 
market is inefficient. If that is the case, the low value of the shares reflects either the 
inefficiency of management, or, simply, that the market believes that future earnings will 
be low. "In either event, repurchasing signals nothing other than a willingness on the part 
of the company's directors artificially to affect the price of their company's shares. It will 
distort the market, reducing the market's effectiveness in allocating resources, and, from 
the point of view of the company's shareholders, will amount to nothing more than the 
creation of a lottery, especially where the repurchase takes the form of a general offer to 
acquire shares at a premium." (Blackman et ai, 2002, p 5-57). 
The soundness of using repurchases to bring market prices up to management's judgment 
of correct value has been questioned elsewhere by Brudney and Bratton (1993). In the 
first place, they question whether management's judgment is a legitimate pricing factor 
comparable to the judgment of buyers and sellers. They also question whether it is 
appropriate to use the company's cash to cure the misperception regarding value rather 
than releasing information. Finally, they question whether it is appropriate for 
management ever to use corporate assets to favour one set of stockholders (the non-
sellers) over another (the sellers) by causing the corporation to make a 'bargain' purchase 
on the market. 13 
130ne of the authors of this criticism states in another work, "Apart from tax advantages, there is reason to 
question the propriety of market repurchases made only because they are the company's 'best' investment. 
In theory, management is precluded from distributing assets to some members of the class and not to others. 
Yet a market repurchase is just such a skewed distribution - to the probable disadvantage rather than the 
advantage of the distributees ... " V Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 Va.L.Rev.1019, 1047-48, 
quoted in Brudney and Bratton (1993), pp 637-638. 
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It has been said that the common explanation offered by managers for repurchasing 
shares that "the market has persisted in undervaluing our shares and the repurchase 
program will, we expect, help bring the stock's market price up to its true value" is on 
one level readily understandable and credible (Clark, 1986),14 but on closer examination 
this reasoning appears highly suspect. "If we credit the efficient-markets theory - and 
there is now substantial evidence in support of that theory - we will find it difficult to 
believe that the market systematically and persistently undervalues public corporations." 
(Clark, 1986, p 629). A second difficulty with this theory is that "the socially preferred 
way to correct rnisevaluation is to supply better information." (Clark, 1986, p 629).15 
Concerns have also been expressed as to whether share repurchases, more particularly, 
the announcement of open market repurchases, are merely an attempt by management to 
raise the firm's stock price at little or no cost (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). 
Presumably, the concern is that companies will announce an intention to repurchase in 
the hope that the announcement itself will drive the share price up, and then fail to carry 
out the announced intention. 16 A study of a sample of 450 repurchase programmes 
announced in the USA from 1981 to 1990 estimated that firms actually repurchased 74% 
to 82% of announced levels of repurchases. It would therefore appear that there is some 
14 "All of us can sympathize with the manager who thinks the brilliance and wisdom of his strategy for his 
company is simply not perceived by those thickheaded, uninspired stock market analysts. ('No imagination. 
No long term view. All they care about is short-run profits.' Etc.)" (Clark, 1986, p 628) 
15 Clark (1986), p 629 "If the managers of a company think the market misunderstands them, shouldn't they 
simply work harder at communicating those facts, plans, opinions, judgments, and the like that lead them to 
place a high value on their corporation? Under what causal theory will having the company buy back shares, 
as opposed to having the company give out better information and explanations, lead more certainly to a 
valid 'correction' of market values? Basically, the corporation's repurchase of shares will affect market 
price in one of two ways. Market participants may read the repurchase program as a signal that 
management knows information that leads it to predict a brighter future for the company. But why 
shouldn't management simply convey such information and predictions directly? Or if the market trusts 
nonverbal signals more, why shouldn't they simply raise their regular dividends? Alternatively, the 
repurchase may lead to a rise in market price because it creates an appearance of active trading based on 
favourable non-public information that in reality does not exist. But if this is what the repurchase program 
amounts to, it constitutes manipulation, which is a crime under the federal securities laws and performs no 
economically useful function." 
16 The possibility of this occurring in South Africa was clearly real enough for the JSE to lay down 
paragraph S.69(h) of the Listing Requirements, which provides that "if a company has announced that it 
will make a specific repurchase, it must pursue the proposal, unless the JSE permits the company not to do 
so." As has been seen, however, there is no requirement that a company make an announcement prior to 
commencement of actual repurchases under a general authority. Announcements must be made only upon 
the achievement of successive 3% thresholds. 
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reason to conclude that this concern is not without foundation. On the other hand, 57% of 
firms actually repurchased more shares than originally announced (Stephens and 
Weisbach, 1998). 
4.4 Summary and Conclusions 
In summary, the signalling hypothesis in its various manifestations appears to have 
attracted widespread support in the USA as the principal reason for share repurchases and 
the principal cause for increases in share prices following repurchases. The hypothesis is 
not, however, without its detractors, some of whom have raised very cogent, logical and 
persuasive arguments against it. 
Solid as these counter-arguments may be, however, the weight of opinion amongst USA 
writers appears to be that managers who believe their companies to be undervalued can 
increase the long-term value of the shares by repurchasing, and in any event, the fact 
remains that empirical evidence from the studies referred to in this chapter tends to 
support the signalling hypothesis. 
It must be remembered, however, that almost the entire body of research relating to the 
signalling hypothesis emanates from the USA, and the discussion in this chapter relating 
to this hypothesis and its effect on shareholder wealth is based largely on the USA 
experience. The regulatory environment in that country differs considerably from that in 
South Africa, and caution should therefore be exercised when drawing conclusions 
regarding the application of these studies to the South African situation. One of the 
objectives of this study is to examine the effect of repurchases on shareholder wealth in 
South Africa, and that aspect will be examined later. 17 
If we accept the signalling hypothesis, it seems that the important deductions to be 
derived from the studies referred to above are the following: 
17 See Chapters 5 and 6 below. 
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• As a result of signalling, repurchases tend to lead to increased abnormal returns in 
share prices, whatever form (fixed-tender offer, Dutch-auction or open-market) 
the repurchase may take; 
• The form of repurchase does, however, tend to influence the size of abnormal 
returns; 
• The proportion of shares repurchased may influence the size of returns; 
• The premium paid for repurchased shares may influence the size of returns; 
• The extent of management's interest in the repurchasing firm may influence the 
size of returns. 
The empirical study of share repurchases carried out in South Africa discussed later will 
attempt to relate the effects of those repurchases on shareholder wealth to the deductions 
referred to above. 
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The preceding chapters discussed the concept, theory and framework behind repurchases. 
One of the conclusions emerging from these chapters is that a company may repurchase 
its shares for any of a number of reasons, the most favoured reason in the USA being to 
support or improve the share price. The signalling hypothesis provides the underpinning 
for this reason: it is argued under this hypothesis that a repurchase signals good news to 
the market which responds by increasing the share price and hence enhancing shareholder 
value. 
Empirical evidence emerging from studies in the USA shows that irrespective of the type 
of repurchase, the share prices of repurchasing companies do in fact tend to show rapid 
and sustained improvements which are reflected in Cumulative Abnormal Returns, such 
returns being ascribed to the repurchases. Evidence also shows that the extent of such 
enhancement is influenced by the method employed for a repurchase, the most significant 
enhancement being achieved by the methods which provide the greatest information 
content. Furthermore, the extent of the enhancement is also influenced by the stake which 
management has in the company; the more management has to lose or gain by a 
repurchase, the greater the value of the signal conveyed by the repurchase and hence the 
more seriously it is taken by the market. 
These conclusions provide the framework for the empirical research referred to in the 
present chapter and later chapters relating to share repurchases in South Africa. These 
chapters concern respectively the methodology employed in the research, the findings 
relating to the reasons for repurchases, and the findings relating to the effects of 
repurchases on shareholder wealth. The research is aimed at answering the questions 
posed in Chapter 1, namely: 
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• Why do firms in South Africa repurchase shares? and 
• Do share repurchases create shareholder value? 
The present chapter deals with the methodology which was employed in order to achieve 
this end. The research methodology used is known as empirical archival analysis. 
Archival analysis involves the collection and analysis of already recorded data relating to 
events or phenomena which have occurred in the past. The purpose of such an analysis is 
to discern or identify a trend or trends from these events so as to enable us to determine 
the reasons for, and make predictions about, similar events or phenomena which may 
occur in the future. 
It is submitted that archival analysis is an appropriate methodology for purposes of 
answering the research questions referred to above. It will be recalled I that the JSE 
Listing Requirements require the publication of certain information relating to specific 
repurchases, more particularly, information relating to the reasons for repurchases, the 
types of repurchases, the magnitude of repurchases and the sums involved. In addition, 
the date of publication of such information provides a very clear reference point for the 
commencement of any observation period. The information which is so published in 
regard to specific repurchases constitutes a publicly recorded body of data which is 
objective in character and which lends itself to such analysis. Archival analysis also 
facilitates longitudinal studies, which are appropriate when research questions are 
affected by variations in circumstances over time (Hair et ai, 2003). 
The broad methodology employed in this research having been established, attention is 
now turned to the techniques used for purposes of researching each of the research 
questions. These are discussed in detail below. 
1 See Chapter 2 
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5.2 Identifying Reasons for Repurchases 
As far as answering the first research question is concerned, namely, the determination of 
the reasons for which share repurchases are carried out by South African companies, the 
following approach was adopted: 
• The McGregor's BFA database was scrutinised for specific repurchase circulars 
issued by listed companies as required by paragraph 11.23 and announcements 
under paragraphs 11.24 and 11.25 of the JSE Listing Requirements; 
• The period covered was from 1999, being the year in which the relevant 
amendments to the Companies Act came into force, to the last day of December 
2004; 
• Inasmuch as this aspect of the research was concerned only with the reasons for 
repurchases, and not with the effect of repurchases, the sample was not limited by 
any requirement relating to a minimum observation period; 
• Where, in non-compliance with the listing requirements, the reason for the 
repurchase was not stated in the circular or the reason was not discernable, the 
repurchase was excluded; 
• Repurchases which were carried out for purposes of effecting odd-lot offers were 
excluded, inasmuch as these are assumed to have been performed for 
administrative rather than strategic reasons; 
• All known specific repurchases, with the exception of those where the reason for 
the repurchase could not be ascertained and odd-lot repurchases, were therefore 
subject to inclusion in the sample. 
5.3 Presentation of Research on Reasons 
The names of the companies selected for this purpose are set out in Appendix "A". A 
total of 55 repurchases (carried out by 47 companies) were examined for this purpose. 
The reasons for repurchases as disclosed in the circulars were then categorised and 
tabulated in Appendix "B". In cases where a company carried out more than one 
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repurchase, the different repurchases are distinguished numerically, for example, "Aspen 
(I)" and "Aspen (2)." 
The results of the study relating to reasons for repurchases are discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.4 Determining whether Repurchases Enhance Shareholder Value 
As far as the second research question is concerned, namely, the determination of the 
effects of repurchases on shareholder wealth, the following approach was adopted: 
• Again, the McGregor's BFA database was scrutinised for announcements of 
specific repurchases by listed companies; 
• An observation period commencing one year prior to the announcement date and 
ending two years after the announcement date in each case was selected; 
• In cases where the observation period would have ended after 31 May 2005, these 
were eliminated from the sample; 
• Companies which had carried out repurchases but which for whatever reason had 
been de-listed prior to the expiration of the two-year post-announcement period 
were also eliminated from the sample; 
• If for any reason the process could not be fully tracked, for example, if 
confirmation could not be obtained from published announcements that the 
repurchase had not been approved by the shareholders in general meeting, or if a 
complete history of the share price within the pre-and post-announcement periods 
could not be obtained, then the repurchase was also excluded from the sample; 
• If in any case a second repurchase was carried out by the same company within 
the observation period, then the first repurchase was excluded. 
It follows that the sample used for this objective would, by virtue of a number of 
companies being excluded, be smaller than that used for the first objective.2 In total, 26 
2 It is acknowledged that the sample is small, but this is inevitable given the relatively low level of 
repurchase activity in South Africa compared to that in the USA. 
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repurchases were selected for purposes of the second objective. The names of the 
companies involved in this exercise are marked with an asterisk in Appendix "A". 
As has been noted previously, all repurchases considered for purposes of this objective 
were specific repurchases. Of the 26 repurchases considered, 5 were specific repurchases 
made with pm rata offers, and the remaining 21 were specific repurchases made with 
specific offers. It is important to keep this in mind when comparing the results of this 
study with the results of USA studies, which typically involved open-market purchases, 
tender offers and Dutch auctions. 
Each of the repurchases which was examined for this purpose has been summarised, as 
set out in Appendix "C". This appendix sets out the following information in relation to 
each repurchase, which, or so it is submitted, may have a bearing on the effect which a 
particular repurchase may have on shareholder wealth: 
• the date of the announcement of the repurchase; 
• the type of offer (that is to say, a specific offer or pro rata offer)3, the hypothesis 
being, as suggested by USA studies,4 that the type of offer may influence the 
share price; 
• an indication of whether the shares were cancelled or purchased as treasury 
shares, it being submitted that the fate of the shares may provide a signal 
regarding the intentions of the company and hence influence the share price;5 
• the percentage of shares targeted for repurchase;6 it will be recalled that USA 
studies indicate that the proportion of shares repurchased influences the share 
. 7 
pnce; 
3 See Chapters 2 and 3 for discussions on the different types of offers. 
4 See Chapter 4 above. 
5 The question to be answered is whether the market would view the retention of treasury shares as a 
positive signa\. Intuition suggests that it would not, as this would indicate to the market that the company 
could easily reissue the shares, thereby negating any positive effect of a repurchase. 
6 In the case of pro rata offers, the proportion of shares targeted is announced, but that proportion need not 
necessarily actually be acquired. 
7 See Chapter 4 above. 
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• the price paid in relation to the market price (at market, at a premium, or at a 
discount); again, it will be recalled that USA studies indicate that the price paid 
may influence share value;8 
• The size of the interest of directors in the company; this may also influence share 
value, as suggested by USA studies.9 
Once qualifying repurchases had been selected, the closing share price for each company 
was obtained for each trading day within the combined period of three years. These 
prices were matched with corresponding daily closing JSE All Share Index prices and 
closing prices for the relevant sector over the same period. All prices were obtained from 
the McGregor's database. 
In order to determine the effect of repurchases on shareholder wealth, it was necessary to 
establish a method of measuring the effect of a repurchase on the share price. To this end, 
the Cumulative Abnormal Return method was applied to the share data. This method has 
been used in a number of studies conducted on repurchases in the USA. 10 In South Africa, 
a variation of this methodology was used by van den Honert et ai, (1988) in order to 
determine abnormal returns following mergers. The methodology used in the present 
study is in essence an adaptation of that method. This involves the following steps as 
described by van den Honert et ai, modified for the purposes of the present study: 
• The daily share prices and indices were converted to daily percentage returns 
according to the following formula: 
Rit = Pit- Pit-l x 100 
Pit- 1 
Where: Rit 
x See Chapter 4 above. 
9 See Chapter 4 above. 
the return on share or index i on day t 
10 See, for example, Vermaelen (1981), and also Asquith and Mullins (1986). 
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the price of share or index i on day t 
Pit -1 the price of share or index i on day t -1 
Daily returns were used in preference to weekly or monthly returns so as to allow 
greater precision in determining when abnormal returns occur in relation to the 
announcement date. 
• The return of the share on any given day was then determined by applying the 
two-factor market-industry model, which may be written as follows: 
Rit = 80+ 81 Rmt+82Sit+ €it 
Where: Rit 
Rmt 
80,81 
and 82 = 
the return on share i on day t 
the return on the market on day t 
the return on the relevant sector on day t 
the stochastic error term 
the regression coefficients 
This model was used in order to exclude the effect of market-wide and sector-
wide information (van den Honert et ai, 1988). 
A least-squares regressIOn was employed to determine the parameters of the 
equation. The daily share returns of each company, expressed as a percentage, 
were regressed against the All Share Index returns and the relevant sector index 
returns over a period of one year up to the announcement date and a period of two 
years after the announcement date. The Excel "Regression" function was used for 
this purpose. 
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• The ordinary least-square estimates of Bo, B, and B2 having been determined, the 
• 
expected daily returns for each share were calculated by inserting the daily market 
and index returns into the model, and the following formula was applied: 
1\ 1\ 1\ 
ERit = Bo + B, Rmt + B2 Sit 
Where: ERit = the expected return on share i on day t 
Rmt = the market return on day t 
Sit = the sector return on day t 
1\ 1\ 
Bo,B, 
1\ 
andB2 = the ordinary least square estimates of Bo, B, and B2 
The abnormal daily return for the share was then calculated by means of 
subtracting the expected daily return for the share from the actual daily return for 
the share, as follows: 
Where: ARit = the abnormal return for share i on day t 
Rit = the actual return for share i on day t 
ERit = the expected return for share i on day t 
If a calendar day fell on a non-trading day, then the share, market and sector prices on the 
next trading day thereafter were used, 
The abnormal daily returns for each share having been established, these were then 
accumulated over the observation period. Cumulative Abnormal Returns ("CARs") were 
calculated first from the commencement of the observation period until the last day of the 
period. The returns were then adjusted so that a zero return would be reflected on the 
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announcement date of each repurchase, the intention being to show more clearly the 
increase or decrease in cumulative returns in relation to the announcement date. In other 
words, a CAR of x % on a given day shows that the CAR for that day differed by x % 
from the abnormal return on the announcement day. 
The CARs for all of the shares where then averaged in order to determine the Cumulative 
Average Abnormal Returns ("CAARs"). To this end, the announcement dates for all 
repurchases were aligned. Due to the fact that the number of trading days for each one-
year pre-announcement period and each two-year post-announcement period was not 
quite the same, standardised numbers of 248 daily observations corresponding to the pre-
announcement period and 496 daily observations corresponding to the post-
announcement period were used. 
The repurchases were further categorised as follows: 
• They were divided between pro rata offers and specific offers, the intention being 
to determine whether there is any discernible difference in the effect that each of 
these two methods has on shareholder wealth; 
• They were divided into (i) repurchases made at market price, (ii) those made at a 
premium on market price, and (iii) those made at a discount on market price, the 
intention being to determine whether the price paid in relation to the market price 
has any effect on the share price; 
• They were divided according to the proportion of shares which are subject to the 
repurchase, in order to determine whether the magnitude of the repurchase has 
any influence on the share price. Repurchases were divided between those where 
the proportion of shares repurchased was (i) less than 10% of the number of 
issued shares ("small repurchases"), (ii) from 10% to 20% ("medium 
repurchases"), and (iii) more than 20% ("large repurchases"). In the case of pro 
rata offers, the proportion of shares which was stated to be the maximum number 
which the company intended to acquire was taken as the relevant proportion; 11 
11 A feature of a pro rata offer is that it is not until the offer period closes that it is known how many shares 
were actually repurchased; the announcement will simply state the maximum number of shares which a 
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• They were divided according to the size of the shareholding of directors in the 
company concerned, in order to ascertain whether this factor has any effect on 
share price. Repurchases were divided between those where the proportion of 
shares was (i) less than 10% of the number of issued shares ("small interests"), (ii) 
from 10% to 20% ("medium interests"), and (iii) more than 20% ("large 
interests"). 12 
CAARs for each of these categories were calculated and compared with the overall 
CAARs for all of the repurchases in the sample. 
It will be seen that the categories referred to above largely mirror the categorisation used 
in the studies undertaken in the USA, the intention being to determine whether the factors 
identified in the USA as influencing share price also playa role in South Africa. 13 
Finally, the share prices of each of the companies as at the announcement date were 
compared with the share prices on the 20th day following the announcement and at the 
end of the observation period. The prices compared in this case were the actual prices at 
the given date, and were not cumulative returns, abnormal or otherwise. 
5.5 Presentation of Results of Research on Shareholder Value 
The results of the analysis are presented as follows: 
• Appendix "D 1" summarises, in tabulated form, the CARs for each of the 
companies as well as the overall CAARs, for every 20 trading days from the 
commencement date of the observation period (i.e. from the beginning of the one-
year pre-announcement period), up to the 20th day before the announcement date, 
and then every day until the announcement date; and 
company intends to repurchase. In the case of a specific offer, on the other hand, the number of shares to be 
repurchased will be fixed, prior to the announcement, by agreement with the party or parties from whom 
the shares are to be repurchased. 
12 See discussion on effect of size of interest in Chapter 4 above. 
13 See discussion in Chapter 4 above. 
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• Appendix "D2" summanses the CARs and CAARs every day for the first 30 
trading days following the announcement date, then the 40th day, and then for 
every 20 trading days thereafter until the end of the observation period (i.e. until 
the end of the two-year post-announcement period). 
• Appendix "E" contains graphs showing various CAARs and CARs, as follows: 
o Graph 1 shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for the entire 
sample of 26 repurchases from the beginning of the observation period to 
the end of the observation period. The lower line of this graph shows the 
CAARs calculated over the observation period with reference to the 
beginning of the period, whilst the upper line shows the CAARs calculated 
over the observation period but adjusted to the announcement date - in 
other words, the upper line mirrors the lower line, save that it is adjusted 
upwards so that the CAAR on the announcement date is zero. The 
intention is to show more clearly the change in CAARs in relation to the 
announcement date (both before and after announcement); 
o Graph 2 shows the CAARs for a period from 30 days before to 30 days 
after the announcement date, the intention being to show more clearly the 
short term effect of repurchases on share value (again, this graph has two 
lines, having the same purpose described above); 
o Graphs 3 to 28 show Cumulative Abnormal Returns for each repurchase 
for a period commencing 30 days before and ending 30 days after the 
announcement date, in order to show in more detail the short-term effect 
of individual repurchases; 
o Graph 29 shows the CAARs of the various companies when categorised 
according to whether the price paid was the market price, at a premium to 
market, or at a discount; 
o Graph 30 shows the CAARs when categorised according to the type of 
offer (i.e. specific or pro rata) in relation to overall CAARs; 
o Graph 31 shows the CAARs when categorised according to the percentage 
of shares repurchased or targeted, as small, medium or large repurchases; 
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o Graph 32 shows the CAARs when categorised according to whether the 
shares were cancelled, purchased as treasury shares, or in combination, in 
relation to overall CAARs; 
o Graph 33 shows the CAARs when categorised according to the size of the 
directors' interest (small, medium and large). 
• Appendix "F' shows the share pnces of the varIOUS compames as at the 
announcement date, 20 days thereafter, and at the end of the observation period, 
as well as the percentage changes. 
The results are discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.6 Limitations of Research 
This research was not without its weaknesses and limitations, principal amongst which 
were the following: 
o The relative unavailability of data and the relatively small number of examples 
suitable for analysis. Compared to the USA, where there are literally thousands of 
examples of repurchases available for analysis, in South Africa, the total number 
of repurchases is but a few hundred, and of these only a small proportion was 
suitable for present purposes; 
o The difficulty in isolating the effects of a repurchase from the effects of other 
events which may have given rise to changes in share prices. Whilst the CAR 
method may effectively isolate the effects in the short term, later events unrelated 
to the repurchase might affect the share price; 
o Related to the preceding difficulty is the difficulty which anses when the 
repurchase occurs in conjunction with some other event. For example, a company 
might announce the disposal of an asset and at the same time announce that the 
proceeds of the disposal will be used to effect a repurchase. In such a case, there 
is no way of apportioning the effect of a change in CARs between the two events. 
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It is nonetheless submitted that, whilst these limitations rendered the research 
environment less than ideal, none of them detracted significantly from the validity of the 
research or from the soundness of any of the conclusions reached. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 
Research Results 
74 
This chapter provides an analysis and discussion of the research results which were 
obtained following the methodology described in Chapter 5. The two research objectives 
will again be considered separately. 
6.2 Reasons for Repurchases 
The first research objective as stated in Chapter 1 is to identify the reasons for South 
African companies carrying out repurchases. 
Fifty-five repurchases were examined for this purpose. The reasons for specific 
repurchases having been extracted from the relevant circulars, they were then arranged 
into twenty-eight categories. The results are set out in Appendix "B". It will be noticed 
that a number of companies (four) engaged in more than one repurchase. A substantial 
minority (nineteen) gave more than one reason for the repurchase. 
It must be emphasised that some licence was taken in placing repurchases in a particular 
category, this being due to the reasons in some cases having been imprecisely or 
apparently erroneously stated in the circulars. Assumptions therefore had to be made in 
these cases as to the precise intention behind the reason given in the circular. 14 
14 For example, in more than one instance, the stated reason was given as "to enhance net earnings" or 
words to that effect. If a mere repurchase had the magical effect of enhancing the net earnings of a 
company, it would no doubt be a far more popular device than it actually is. In such a case, it was assumed 
that the actual reason was to "enhance net earnings per share." 
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The reasons are set out in Table 1 below, in order of frequency: 
Table 1 
Reason Frequency 
1. Enhance the company's earnings per share 13 
2. Enhance the company's net assets per share 10 
3. Create, maximise or enhance value for shareholders 6 
4. Distribute/deploy current cash resources effecti vel y / more 5 
efficient utilisation of cash 
5. Enable or facilitate exit of disinvesting shareholder I) 5 
6. Increase return on shareholders' equity 4 
7. Shares held by share incentive trust surplus to requirements 10 4 
8. Disposal of shares held by share incentive trust to comply with 3 
JSE requirements 17 
9. Facilitate, or in anticipation of, winding up III 2 
10. Facilitate introduction of BEE participant 1'1 2 
11. Remove uncertainty regarding shareholder's continued 2 
participation in company 20 
15 This might typically occur when a shareholder wishes to withdraw but there is no ready market for his 
shares. 
16 This might occur when a share trust acquires shares for onward transfer to employees, but there is 
insufficient demand for such shares. 
17 The Listings Requirements of the JSE require that a share trust dispose of any shares for which binding 
unconditional agreements do not exist between participants and the trustees for participants to acquire 
these shares from the share trust. 
18 The intention here would presumably be to expedite the return of funds to shareholders so as to avoid 
delays inevitably occasioned by the winding-up process. 
19 The intention in such cases appears to have been to retain the shares as treasury shares and then transfer 
the shares to a suitable BEE candidate, the perceived advantage probably being that such a course of action 
would avoid the need to authorise or issue fresh shares, and, in the process, to avoid diluting existing 
shareholdings. 
20 This might imply that a shareholder had indicated a desire to withdraw but considerations such as the 
absence of a replacement shareholder or the unwillingness of existing shareholders to utilise their own 
funds to purchase the shares necessitated a repurchase. 
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12. Tennination of strategic allianceLi 2 
13. Settlement of claim against shareholder LL 2 
14. Capitalise on opportunity presented by shareholder's disposal of 1 
interest 
IS. Reduce cost of capital 1 
16. Reduce discount at which shares are trading 1 
17. Comply with undertaking to underpin value of shareslj 1 
18. Take advantage of low share price 1 
19. Stabilise share price 1 
20. Resolve a dispute between company and sharehoiderL4 1 
21. Unlock value for departing shareholders 1 
22. Repurchase in best interest of company and shareholders 1 
23. Eliminate N shares 1 
24. Shares trading at a discount 1 
25. Termination of share incentive scheme due to value of shares 1 
being lower than purchase price 
26. Eliminate cross-holding 1 
27. Facilitate a clearer focus on the company's growth strategy 1 
28. Other / no reason given L) 10 
21 For example, a company might have acquired shares in another company in anticipation of benefiting 
from "synergies" created by the acquisition, but these failed to materialise. The company whose shares 
were acquired would then repurchase them. 
22 This might typically occur when a shareholder owes a company money for any of a number of causes, 
such as the purchase price for assets acquired from the company by the shareholder. The company would 
repurchase shares from the shareholder, and the price would be set off against the amount owed by the 
shareholder. For practical purposes, this would amount to an exchange of shares for assets. 
23 In the single instance of this reason being tendered, the company had issued shares to a shareholder in 
consideration for the assets of a business acquired from the shareholder, and warranted that the price of the 
shares would be "underpinned" i.e. would not drop below a certain value. When the price did in fact drop 
below the stated value, it was agreed that the company would repurchase the shares at the "underpinned" 
~nce. 
~4 As part of the settlement between the company and the shareholder, it was agreed that the company 
would repurchase the shareholder's shares. 
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It may be said that some of the reasons have the same import as, or are similar to, other 
reasons, or are related to other reasons. It is therefore of some value to group these 
similar or related reasons in order to ascertain general trends. The stated reasons may be 
conveniently grouped into three broad categories: 
• To enhance the value of shares for the benefit of remaining shareholders, 
including by means of enhancing earnings and assets per share, and increasing 
return on equity, and reducing the cost of capital. This broad category would 
include the reasons stated in 1,2,3,6, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19,22 and 24 above. 
Taken together, these reasons were used on 40 occasions, or in 73% of the 
repurchases included in the sample, and they account for the largest group of 
stated reasons for carrying out share repurchases. 
• To deliver value to exiting shareholders. This includes the reasons stated in 4 
and 21 above. Reasons given under this broad category were used on 6 
occasions, or in 11 % of the repurchases used in the sample. 
• "Other" reasons. This broad category includes all reasons other than those 
stated in the previous two categories. Reasons falling into this category were 
used in 38 repurchases, or in 69% of repurchases used in the sample.26 
The conclusions to be drawn from this exercise are that: 
• In general terms, the main motivating factor behind share repurchases in 
South Africa is the enhancement of value for remaining shareholders; the term 
"enhancement of value" in this context includes enhancing earnings per share, 
enhancing net assets per share, increasing return on equity, reducing cost of 
capital, taking advantage of investment opportunity or low share price, 
reducing discount at which shares are trading, and stabilising the share price; 
25 Repurchases where no attempt to state the reason for which the repurchase was made (in non-compliance 
with the JSE Listing Requirements) in the relevant circular, or where the reason given for the repurchase 
could not be ascertained ex facie the document, were placed under this category. In some cases this had to 
be done because the reasons given in the circular were so indistinctly stated that it was impossible to 
categorise them meaningfully in any other way. 
26 The percentages clearly add up to more than 100%. It should be kept in mind that more than one reason 
was given in a number of cases. The percentage reflects the cases in which reasons falling in a particular 
category were used as a proportion of all the repurchases in the sample, not as a proportion of the total 
number of reasons given. 
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• Redeploying funds to exiting shareholders for purposes of making more 
efficient use of excess funds is used as a reason relatively infrequently; 
• The category of "other" reasons covers a wide spectrum, including some of a 
uniquely South African character. The reasons in this category do not purport 
to be value-related (whether in favour of remaining shareholders or exiting 
shareholders), but this is not to suggest that repurchases carried out for any 
reason in this category need not create value; 
• Tax considerations were not cited in even one case, and therefore do not 
appear to play any role in repurchases; this differs from the situation in the 
USA, but this is not surprising, given the different tax treatment of 
repurchases in South Africa; 
• Reducing the cost of capital (which is included in the general category of 
"enhancement of value") was cited in only one case, suggesting that in South 
Africa, this is not considered a significant reason for repurchasing shares. 
The fact that the most common motivating factor is that a repurchase is aimed, in one 
way or another, at enhancing shareholder value gives rise to interesting questions in the 
context of the agency theory, which was earlier alluded to briefly.27 The agency theory 
addresses the conflicts of interest which arise when the personal goals of management 
compete with the demands of shareholder wealth enhancement. A potential conflict of 
interests arises immediately whenever a manager owns less than 100% of the shares in a 
company (Brigham and Daves, 2004). In the case of publicly traded companies, the risk 
of conflict of interests is so much greater because the size of management's interest is 
usually considerably smaller than in the case of closely held, private companies. The 
question therefore arises as to whether managers (or, more particularly, in the South 
African experience, the board of directors) are acting in the interests of shareholders by 
embarking on share repurchases, or are they merely protecting or enhancing their own 
interests? Related to this inquiry is the question of whether the stated or presumed 
objective of enhancing shareholder value is in fact achieved. Or is the outcome of a 
repurchase in practice unrelated to or independent of its apparent rationale? The next 
27 See Chapter 3. 
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section deals with the issue of whether repurchases do in fact create value, and in the 
process, the relationship between intent and result will be examined. 
6.3 The Creation of Shareholder Value 
The second research objective as stated in Chapter 1 is to detennine whether repurchases 
create shareholder value, by reference to the returns of the shares concerned. This section 
attempts to achieve that objective by analysing the data contained in the tables in 
Appendices "D 1", "D2", and "F' and the graphs contained in Appendix "E." 
The Cumulative Abnormal Return method was described earlier and it was shown how 
this method was applied to the current study in order to determine the effect of 
repurchases on shareholder wealth. 
Graph 1 in Appendix "E" read with Appendix "D 1" shows a long-term (albeit not 
consistent) decline of CAARs from the beginning of the observation period, that is, one 
year before the announcement date. The CAAR at the beginning of the period is 13.06% 
(in other words, it is 13.06% higher than the average abnormal return on the 
announcement date). It then declines until a point about 200 days before the 
announcement date, whereafter it recovers and then declines again until a point 
approximately 100 days before the announcement date, when it shows an almost 
continuous improvement until shortly before the announcement date. Graphs 1 and 2 read 
with Appendix "D2" indicate that CAARs show an immediate and substantial increase 
after the announcement date which is largely sustained up to the end of the thirty-day 
post announcement period and beyond. Graph 1 read with Table "D2"shows that the 
positive trend after the announcement date is sustained until the end of the observation 
period, that is, two years after the announcement date. 
It may be tempting to conclude that the evidence reflected by the CAARs shows that a 
repurchase will lead to an increase in shareholder value, both in the short term and the 
long term. A closer examination of the cumulative returns of individual companies shows 
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that this is by no means necessarily the case in individual repurchases. Graphs 3 to 28 
read in conjunction with Table "D2" show that: 
• 1 trading day after the announcement date, 16 companies showed negative CARs, 
with the remaining 10 showing positive CARs; 
• 3 trading days after the announcement date, 12 of the companies showed negative 
CARs, with the remaining 14 showing positive CARs; 
• 10 trading days after the announcement date, 13 showed negative CARs and 13 
showed positive CARs; 
• 20 trading days after the announcement date, 11 showed negative CARs and 15 
showed positive CARs; 
• 30 trading days after the announcement date, 8 showed negative CARs and 18 
showed positive CARs. 
It might have been expected that the effect of a repurchase - if there were to be any effect 
- would be almost instantaneous and would become manifest within a few days of the 
announcement. This expectation is indeed reflected in the CAARs. In the case of 
individual CARs, however, positive returns are in a number of instances reflected only 
some time after announcement, and in other instances, not at all. This indicates that the 
information effect (if it is assumed to convey good news), whilst immediate in some 
cases, takes some time to become manifest in others. Certainly, if the signalling 
hypothesis is to be given any credence, a point must be reached beyond which any 
change in share price could not be attributed to the effects of a repurchase. Assuming that 
such a point must be reached within 20 trading days28 of an announcement, it follows 
that any changes to a share price after that point must be attributable to factors other than 
the repurchase itself. 29 
2H It is acknowledged that this period of 20 days has been arbitrarily selected, but again it is asserted that if 
the signalling hypothesis is to be relied upon, it is to be expected that changes in share price attributable to 
a repurchase would soon become evident; hence, it is submitted, the 20 day period is, if anything, 
somewhat generous. 
29 All of the companies demonstrated "outliers," both positive and negative, in their daily ordinary returns 
during that portion of the post-announcement period which fell after the expiration of 20 trading days. Each 
of these had a significant effect on the CARs and might be attributable to any of a number of events, e.g. 
dividend declarations, release of results, etc. It is highly doubtful that a return of such magnitude as to bring 
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The companies which showed positive CARs 20 days after announcement are set out in 
Table 2 below, in descending order: 
Table 2 
Company CAR % Increase 
l. Moribo 43.90% 
2. Aspen (1) 23.75% 
3. Murray & Roberts 15.66% 
4. AECI 14.24% 
5. Cullinan 12.91 % 
6. DAWN (2) 9.96% 
7. Shoprite 9.lO% 
8. Aquila (1) 7.69% 
9. Hosken 7.72% 
10. Paracon (2) 7.62% 
11. Brandcorp 6.43% 
12. Purple (2) 4.69% 
13. Mustek 3.69% 
14. UCS 3.16% 
15. Transpaco 2.84% 
Of the 15 repurchases carried out by these companies: 
• 12 involved specific offers, and 3 involved pro rata offers; 
• All repurchased shares were cancelled in 7 cases, in 6 cases some shares were 
cancelled and some repurchased as treasury shares, and in 2 cases all shares were 
repurchased as treasury shares; 
it within the category of outlier would be due to a repurchase at such an extended period after the 
announcement date. 
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• The repurchased shares constituted less than 10% ("small repurchases")of the 
issued shares in 7 cases, from 10% to 20% ("medium repurchases") in 4 cases, 
and more than 20% ("large repurchases") in 4 cases; 
• 5 repurchases were carried out at market prices, 8 at a prerruum and 2 at a 
discount; 
• In 5 cases, the total directors' interest was less than 10% ("small interest"), in 2 
cases it was from 10% to 20% ("medium interest"), and in 8 cases it was more 
than 20% ("large interest"). 
The companies which showed negative CARs 20 days after the announcement are set out 
in Table 3 below, in descending order: 
Table 3 
Company CAR % Decrease 
I. Peregrine -0.26% 
2. Gold Reef -0.85% 
3. Netcare -1.09% 
4. Connection -1.69% 
5. Invicta -2.93% 
6. Control -3.42% 
7. BJM -3.55% 
8. InvestecJU -6.04% 
9. Purple (1) -6.74% 
10. PSG -15.68% 
11. Quyn -23.08% 
Of the 11 repurchases carried out by these companies: 
• 9 involved specific offers, and 2 involved pro rata offers; 
30 In the case of Investec, the size of the repurchase was so small (0.61 % of issued shares) that it must be 
open to question whether it had any significant influence on share price. Although Investec has been 
included in this study, the findings insofar as they relate to Investec must be treated with caution. 
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• Repurchased shares were all cancelled in 3 cases, in 5 cases some shares were 
cancelled and some repurchased as treasury shares, and in 3 cases all shares were 
repurchased as treasury shares; 
• The repurchased shares constituted small repurchases In 4 cases, medium 
repurchases in 4 cases, and large repurchases in 3 cases; 
• 1 repurchase was carried out at market price, 6 were carried out at a premium and 
4 at a discount; 
• In 4 cases, the total directors' interest was small, in 5 cases it was medium, and in 
2 cases it was large. 
An examination of graphs 29 to 33 in Appendix "E", which show CAARs segmented 
according to price paid, type of offer, size of repurchase, fate of shares and size of 
directors' interests, would suggest that, in the short term: 
• The CAARs of companies which repurchased at market price increased to a far 
greater extent than those which repurchased at a premium (which is difficult to 
explain, given the findings of the USA studies), which in tum increased to a 
greater extent than those which purchased at a discount (which is consistent with 
expectations ); 
• Repurchases which involved specific offers produced far greater returns than 
those involving pro rata offers (it will be recalled from the examination of the 
USA studies that the tender offer - the closest equi valent of our pro rata offer -
was considered to have the most information content; but it may well be argued 
that our specific offer, which does not have a frequently used counterpart in the 
USA, provides even more information content); 
• For most of the short-term observation period, small repurchases produced greater 
CAARs than did large repurchases (which, again in the light of USA studies, IS 
surprising), but both produced greater CAARs than medium repurchases; 
• Where all shares were cancelled, CAARs were greater than in cases where all 
shares were purchased as treasury shares (which would seem to suggest that the 
fact that shares are to be cancelled would be viewed as a firmer signal of good 
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news) which in tum produced greater CAARs than where some shares were 
cancelled and others purchased as treasury shares; 
• Where directors had a small interest, CAARs were greatest (which is surprising, 
given the conclusion in the USA studies that the larger the interest of management, 
the greater the abnormal returns); large interests produced the second best CAARs, 
whilst medium interests produced the lowest CAARs. 
As was indicated above, many of the results of the segmented CAAR analysis described 
above are surprising and counter-intuitive. 
The difficulty with usmg CAARs to evaluate small samples is that individual 
observations may skew the picture unduly. A number of shares which were included in 
the sample were "penny stock" shares, which traded for a few cents; a change in price of a 
few cents (or even one cent) can translate into a substantial difference in percentage terms, 
which would unduly influence the CAARs. It was with this in mind that the CARs after 
20 days were also examined individually rather than on an average basis, as shown above. 
An analysis of the compames which, when observed individually, produced positive 
CARs compared with those which produced negative CARs after 20 days would tend to 
suggest that: 
• Specific offers and pro rata offers were roughly proportionate amongst 
companies which showed positive CARs and those which showed negative CARS 
(80% for positive CAR companies vs. 82% for negative CAR companies); 
• Cases in which shares were all cancelled were disproportionately high amongst 
companies which showed positive CARs, although they did not constitute an 
outright majority (47% vs. 27%); cases in which all shares were repurchased as 
treasury shares were somewhat disproportionately low amongst positive CAR 
companies (40% vs. 45%); cases in which shares were both cancelled and 
repurchased as treasury shares were disproportionately low amongst positive 
CAR companies (13% vs. 27%); 
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• Repurchases which were carried out at a premium were roughly proportionate in 
the case both of those companies which showed positive CARs and those which 
showed negative CARs (53% vs. 54%); discount repurchases constituted a very 
small minority in the case of positive CAR companies and a larger minority in the 
case of negative CAR companies (13% vs. 36%). Repurchases carried out at 
market price were disproportionately large in the case of companies showing 
positive CARs (33% vs. 9%); 
• Small repurchases were disproportionately high amongst companies showing 
positive CARs (47% vs. 36%); medium repurchases were disproportionately low 
amongst positive CAR companies (27% vs. 36%) and exactly proportionate for 
large repurchases (27% each); 
• Cases in which directors held a small interest were roughly proportionate amongst 
both positive CAR companies and negative CAR companies (33% vs. 36%); 
where directors had a medium interest, the incidence was disproportionately low 
for positive CAR companies (13% vs. 45%); and disproportionately high for 
positive CAR companies where directors held a large interest (53% vs. 18%). 
As to the long-term outcome, it will be seen from Appendix "D2" that: 
• Of the 15 companies which showed positive CARs 20 days after the 
announcement date, all but 4 (Aquila, Shoprite, Transpaco and Purple Capital (2)) 
still showed positive CARs at the end of the observation period (i.e. two years 
after announcement); 
• Of the companies which showed negative CARs at 20 days, 7 (Connection Group, 
Gold Reef, Investec, Invicta, Netc are , Purple Capital (1) and Quyn) were still in 
negative territory at the end of the observation period. 
In other words, 15 of the companies showed positive CARs at the end of the observation 
period. This is the same number as at day 20, but not all the same companies made up 
this group. Logic dictates, however, that only those which showed early responses to 
repurchases could lay any claim to having their long-term returns improved as a result of 
the repurchases. 
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A relationship which requires examination IS that between the stated reason for a 
repurchase and its success. It will be recalled that the various reasons for carrying out 
repurchases were examined and arranged into three broad categories, namely: 
• Repurchases aimed at enhancing value for remaining shareholders 
• Repurchases aimed at unlocking value for exiting shareholders 
• Repurchases carried out for "other" reasons. 
Companies which showed positive CARs 20 days after announcement are set out in 
Table 4 below, together with the broad category of reason given for the repurchase: 
Table 4 
Company Reason 
l. Moribo Other 
2. Aspen (1) Enhance Value 
3. M&R Enhance Value 
4. AECI Enhance Val ue 
5. Cullinan Other 
6. DAWN (2) Enhance Value 
7. Shoprite Other 
8. Aquila (1) Enhance Value 
9. Hosken Unlock Value 
10. Paracon (2) Enhance Value 
11. Brandcorp Other 
12. Purple (2) Other 
13. Mustek Other 
14. UCS Other 
15. Transpaco Other 
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Companies which showed negative CARs 20 days after announcement are set out in 
Table 5 below, together with the broad category of reason given for the repurchase: 
Table 5 
Company Reason 
1. Peregrine Other 
2. Gold Reef Enhance Value 
3. Netcare Other 
4. Connection Enhance Value 
5. Invicta Enhance Value 
6. Control Enhance Value 
7. BJM Enhance Value 
8. Investec Other 
9. Purple (1) Unlock Value 
10. PSG Other 
11. Quyn Other 
Of the 11 cases in which the reason for the repurchase was given as to "enhance value," 6 
showed positive CARs after 20 days and 5 showed negative CARs. In the longer term, i.e. 
at the end of the observation period, only 4 of those which initially showed positive 
CARs were still in positive territory. 
Of the two compames which engaged in repurchases ostensibly to unlock value for 
exiting shareholders, one showed positive CARs after 20 days whilst the other showed 
negative CARs. 
It is also interesting to note that of the 15 companies which showed positive CARs after 
20 days, 8 gave "other" reasons for the repurchase - apparently, despite the absence of 
any stated desire to enhance value, this is in fact precisely what was achieved. 
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The question must inevitably arise as to who wins in a repurchase: the shareholders who 
sell or those who remain? Appendix "F' shows the share prices of the various companies 
as at the announcement date, a date being 20 trading days thereafter, and the date at the 
end of the observation period, as well as the percentage changes from the announcement 
date to each of the latter two dates. It must be emphasised that these changes are not 
cumulative nor do they relate to abnormal returns. They merely represent the increase or 
decrease in prices in percentage terms. These changes were then compared to the 
premiums or discounts at which the shares were repurchased, as shown in Table 6 below: 
Table 6 
Company PremiumlDiscount Price Change Day 20 Price Change at end 
1. AECI 0% 17.9% 124.02% 
2. Aquila 13.64% 8.18% 45.45% 
3. Aspen -3.6% 26.51 % 58.31% 
4. BJM -18.5% -4.48% -15.32% 
5. Brandcorp 13% 13.04% 334.78% 
6. Connection 0% 2.5% 255% 
7. Control 2% 1.02% 150% 
8. Cullinan 900% 0% 450% 
9. DAWN 21.6% 8.11 % 548.65% 
10. Gold Reef 20% 4.4% 184% 
11. Hosken 15.9% 9.76% 176.59% 
12. Investec 33.7% -1.9% -25.17% 
13. Invicta -2.49% 0% 142.86% 
14. Moribo 0% 42.86% 114.29% 
15. M &R 4% 19.35% 306.45% 
16. Mustek 0% -9.43% 43.4% 
17. Netcare Unspecified 0.67% 66.33% 
18. Paracon -41% 6.67% -13.33% 
19. Peregrine -9.6% -4% -39.2% 
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20. PSG 190% -16.15% -22.68% 
21. Purple (1) 20.8% 0% -50% 
22. Purple (2) 0% 8.33% -58.33% 
23. Quyn -2.6% -20% -80% 
24. Shoprite 107% 9.3% 24.96% 
25. Transpaco 25.9% 7.41% 37.04% 
26. UCS 0% 0% 100% 
By determining the difference between the premium or discount paid and the percentage 
change in price, and assuming that the exiting shareholders had no investment 
opportunities for the proceeds of the repurchase, an approximation of the relative change 
in wealth of the exiting shareholders and those who remained can be obtained. 
At 20 days, we see that in the following cases, those shareholders who remained were 
relatively better off than those who sold: 
• AECI 
• Aspen 
• BJM 
• Brandcorp (marginally) 
• Connection 
• Invicta 
• Moribo 
• M&R 
• Paracon 
• Peregrine 
• Purple (2)(11 in total); 
and in the following cases, the exiting shareholders were relatively better off: 
• Aquila 
• Control 
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• Cullinan 
• DAWN 
• Gold Reef 
• Hosken 
• Investec 
• Mustek 
• PSG 
• Purple (l) 
• Quyn 
• Shoprite 
• Transpaco 
(13 in total). 
In the case of UCS, there was no difference. The position regarding Netcare could not be 
established. 
As can be seen, in a small majority of cases, the exiting shareholders were better off in 
the short term. 
In the longer term, i.e. at the end of the two-year post-announcement period, the exiting 
shareholders were better off in the case of the following companies: 
• Cullinan 
• Investec 
• Peregrine 
• Purple Capital (1) and (2) 
• Quyn 
• Shoprite 
• PSG 
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In the longer term, therefore, the remaining shareholders were better off in a substantial 
majority of cases. Again, it must be emphasised that this statement is based on the 
assumption that the exiting shareholders had no further investment opportunities for the 
proceeds received by them. 
6.4 Analysis of Results 
In Chapter 4, the findings of various studies on repurchases conducted in the USA were 
discussed. It will be recalled that the findings of many of these studies were fairly 
unequivocal in that they concluded that on the whole, repurchases, whatever form they 
took, resulted in long-term gains for shareholders. In addition, it was concluded that the 
size of the interest of managers in the repurchasing company, the proportion of shares 
repurchased, the price paid and the type of repurchase all had an influence on the extent 
of the gains. The cause of the gains was attributed to the signalling effect of the 
repurchase. 
Having regard to the results obtained in the USA studies, one might have concluded that 
a study of repurchases in South Africa would yield similarly unequivocal results. When 
we examine the results of the present study, however, it would seem that they are 
somewhat more tentative than one might have expected. Certainly, the CAARs of all the 
repurchases suggest that: 
• as a general proposition, specific repurchases are followed by an immediate, 
obvious and long-term sustained increase in CAARs; 
• repurchases conducted at market price yielded the highest short-term gains 
(contrary to expectations); 
• repurchases incorporating specific offers yielded higher short-term CAARs than 
did pro rata offers; 
• small repurchases produce the highest short-term CAARs (also contrary to 
expectations ); 
• in cases where all shares were cancelled (as opposed to being treated as treasury 
shares), CAARs were higher than otherwise; 
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• where directors had a small interest, the largest short-term CAARs were 
produced. 
It must be kept in mind, however, that a small sample of repurchases was relied on for 
purposes of the present study; that being the case, CAARs may be unduly influenced by 
one or two repurchases. 
When individual repurchases are examined, the results are not quite as unequivocal. 
Individual examination would suggest that in the short term: 
• a majority of repurchases resulted in positive CARs in the short term, but over 
the long term, they became a minority; 
• there is no material difference between the ratio of specific to pro rata offers in 
positive CAR-yielding repurchases and in negative CAR-yielding repurchases; 
• whilst repurchases carried out at a premium are equally well-represented amongst 
positive- and negative-yielding repurchases, repurchases carried out at market 
price are better represented amongst positive CAR-yielding repurchases; 
• small repurchases were disproportionately high amongst companies showing 
positive CARs; 
• most repurchases involving large directors' interests resulted in positive CARs. 
The above would tend to support the conclusion that there is evidence to suggest that 
specific repurchases are followed by positive CAARs in both the short term and the long 
term. When repurchases are examined individually, however, it is seen that a majority of 
them show positive CARs in the short term but in the long term only a minority show 
sustained positive CARs over the entire observation period. 
There is very tentative evidence regarding the effects of the size of repurchase, type of 
repurchase, price paid, fate of shares and size of directors' interest, and such evidence as 
there is renders it difficult to draw any conclusions in this regard. 
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As to the environment In South Africa in which repurchases are carried out, it is 
submitted that both statutory provisions and regulations made under these provisions are 
conducive to signalling the views of management to the market. This fact makes the 
somewhat equivocal results, at least insofar as the various factors such as type and size of 
repurchase are concerned, all the more surprising. This may be due to any of a number of 
reasons, such as: 
• The market in South Africa may not be as "conditioned" to signalling as it is in 
the USA; 
• The purpose and intent of repurchases may be differently understood in South 
Africa; 
• Share repurchases may not necessarily be viewed as unequivocally good news in 
South Africa; 
• The market in South Africa is less inclined to believe signals; 
• The market in South Africa is not yet attuned to the subtleties implicit in the 
information content and signalling value of the various factors involved in 
repurchases, such as the size of repurchase, the price paid for the shares, and the 
like. 
A striking observation is the relatively low "success rate" achieved by repurchases at 20 
days after announcement date where the stated or implied intention was to enhance value, 
whilst repurchases carried out for "other" reasons achieved a high rate of positive returns 
at 20 days. One might have thought that logically, if the signalling hypothesis holds true, 
a stated or implied intention to enhance value would have produced a more definitively 
positive effect, whilst "other" reasons would have produced mostly neutral or negative 
results. It turns out, however, that "other" reasons might have as good a prospect of 
resulting in positive returns in the short tenn. 
Finally, it will be recalled that Daly (2002)31 found that there was no significant market 
reaction to the repurchases examined in his study. How can this be reconciled with the 
findings of the present study, which certainly show that in the short term, at least, there 
31 See p 47. 
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was a clear, albeit not overwhelming, reaction to the repurchases covered by it? It is 
submitted that this is at least partly attributable to the fact that the present study focussed 
entirely on specific repurchases as opposed to open market repurchases - a conclusion 
which would be consistent with the notion that the information content accompanying 
specific repurchases is greater than in the case of open-market repurchases in general. 
6.5 Summary of Results 
In summary, the results of this study show that: 
• the most frequently stated reason for the carrying out of share repurchases is to 
enhance value; 
• specific repurchases are followed by an immediate, obvious and long-term 
sustained increase in CAARs; 
• by contrast, when individual CARs are examined, it appears that a majority of 
repurchases resulted in positive CARs in the short term, but over the long term, 
they became a minority; 
• in a small majority of cases, the exiting shareholders were better off in the short 
term than those who remained ( measured by reference to the change in price in 
relation to the premium or discount at which the shares were repurchased); 
• in the longer term, however, the remaining shareholders were better off in a 
substantial majority of cases. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1 Purpose and Scope of and Approach to Study 
95 
This study is concerned with the phenomenon of share repurchases in South Africa. More 
specifically, it focused on repurchases of a particular type, namely, specific repurchases, 
and the questions which it attempted to answer were the following: 
• Why do firms in South Africa repurchase shares? and 
• By so doing, do they create shareholder wealth? 
In order to answer these questions, an empirical archival research methodology was 
employed. For purposes of answering the first question, this involved an examination of 
the publicly stated reasons for which specific repurchases are carried out in South Africa, 
by consulting the circulars and announcements published as required under the JSE 
Listing Requirements in respect of these repurchases. For purposes of the second question, 
the methodology involved the determination and analysis of Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns following the announcement of intended repurchases. 
7.2 Principal Answers 
The principal answers to the research questions are as follows: 
• It was found that the largest single group of reasons for which companies 
repurchased shares related to the enhancement, directly or indirectly, of 
shareholder wealth; 
• Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns do indicate that repurchases are followed 
by the enhancement of shareholder wealth, both in the short term and the long 
term; when the repurchases are examined on an individual basis, however the 
results are more equivocal. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
96 
7.3 Insights Provided by Research 
It is submitted that the following conclusions may be drawn from this evidence: 
• Specific repurchases may result in positive Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns in the short term and that such positive returns are likely to endure for the 
long term; 
• Factors such as the type of offer, the size of the repurchase, the premium paid, the 
size of the directors' interest and the fate of the shares, produce, however, either 
inconclusive results or results which are so counter-intuitive that they are 
inexplicable; 
• Where the stated objecti ve of a repurchase is to enhance shareholder value by 
means of a repurchase, this objective is achieved in the short term in only a small 
majority of cases, and in a minority of cases in the long term; on the other hand, 
where the objective is not stated to be for purposes of enhancing value, that is 
often precisely what occurred - in fact, it occurred in a small majority of cases; 
• There is therefore at best only a tenuous relationship between the intended 
outcome of a repurchase insofar as it relates to shareholder wealth and the actual 
outcome; 
• Similarly, there is at best only a tenuous relationship between the factors referred 
to above (type of offer, size of repurchase, etc) and the creation of shareholder 
wealth. 
Does this suggest that the outcome of a specific repurchase is unpredictable? The 
evidence of the present research tends to suggest that this may well be the case. It must be 
emphasised again that the present study was confined to specific repurchases, and that the 
great majority of repurchases, that is to say, those which may be classified as general 
repurchases, were excluded. As was previously indicated, the result is therefore all the 
more surprising, given the fact that specific repurchases should have more information 
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content and therefore a sample consisting of only specific repurchases would be expected 
to produce more definitive results than a mixed sample. 
7.4 Areas for Further Research 
It is submitted that share repurchases in South Africa have not yet been exhausted as a 
topic of research. The following aspects might, it seem, bear fruit: 
• The somewhat equivocal results of certain aspects of this study suggest that the 
market in South Africa does not view repurchases in quite the same way that 
theorists in the USA suggest that it should. The collecting and analysis of 
empirical evidence on this aspect would prove valuable; 
• Research on pro rata offers would, it is suggested, prove interesting when a larger 
sample of repurchases employing this method becomes available, given the 
purportedly high information content of the closest USA equivalent of the pro 
rata offer, namely, the self-tender offer; 
• Although the reduction of the cost of capital was given as the reason for a 
repurchase in only one case, it would be of value to conduct research into the 
effect of repurchases on the cost of capital, irrespective of the stated reason; 
• Further in-depth study on the beneficiaries of repurchases, i.e. shareholders who 
exit as opposed to those who remain, would, it is submitted, prove useful; 
• A comparison between specific repurchases and general repurchases would also 
prove beneficial, provided that a method can be established of accurately 
determining the date on which the repurchasing company's intentions enter the 
public domain; 
• Research into the purchase of treasury shares, more particularly, as to the reasons 
for which they are repurchased and their ultimate fate, would assist in 
understanding the tendency displayed by companies to have subsidiaries purchase 
at least some of the shares as treasury shares; 
• Research into the choice between repurchases and payments to shareholders under 
Section 90 of the Companies Act would prove valuable. 
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Name of Company 
Acuity Group Holdings Ltd 
AECI Ltd* 
AMB holdings Ltd 
Aquila Growth Ltd* 
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd* 
Autoquip Group Ltd 
Barnard Jacobs Mellet Holdings Ltd* 
BoE Ltd 
Brandcorp Holdings Ltd* 
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd 
CCN Holdings Ltd 
Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd 
Chester Investment Holdings Ltd 
Connection Group Holdings Ltd* 
Control Instruments Ltd* 
Cullinan Holdings Ltd * 
Dalys Ltd 
Appendix A 
Companies 
Distribution and Warehousing Network Ltd* 
Digicore Holdings Ltd 
Electronic Media Network Ltd 
Fortune Beverages Ltd 
Global Village Ltd 
Gold Reef Casino Resorts Ltd* 
Grindrod Ltd 
Grintek Ltd 
Hosken Consolidated Investments Ltd* 
Abbreviation 
Acuity 
AECI 
AMB 
Aquila 
Aspen 
Autoquip 
BJM 
BoE 
Brandcorp 
Capitec 
CCN 
CEP 
Chester 
Connection 
Control 
Cullinan 
Dalys 
DAWN 
Digicore 
EMN 
Fortune 
Global Village 
Gold Reef 
Grindrod 
Grintek 
Hosken 
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Indequity Group Ltd Indequity 
Investec Group Ltd* Investec 
Invicta Holdings Ltd* Invicta 
Iota Financial Services Ltd Iota 
LA Group Ltd LA Group 
Moribo Leisure Ltd* Moribo 
Murray and Roberts Holdings Ltd* M&R 
Mustek Ltd* Mustek 
Netactive Ltd Netactive 
Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd* Netcare 
Onelogix Group Ltd Onelogix 
Ozz Ltd Ozz 
Paracon Holdings Ltd* Paracon 
Peregrine Holdings Ltd* Peregrine 
PSG Group Ltd* PSG 
Purple Capital Ltd* Purple 
Quyn Holdings Ltd* Quyn 
Rand Leases Properties Ltd Rand Leases 
Shoprite Holdings Ltd * Shoprite 
Seardel Investment Corporation Ltd Seardel 
Transpaco Ltd* Transpaco 
UCS Group Ltd* UCS 
Zarara Energy Ltd Zarara 
* Indicates that the company was included in the sample for purposes of the second 
research objective as well as the first 
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Appendix B 
ACUITY AECI AMB AQUILA I AQUILA 2 ASPEN I ASPEN 2 AUTOQUIP BJM 
I Enhance the company's earnings per share X X X 
2 Enhance the company's net asset value per share X X X 
3 Create, minimise or enhance value for shareholder 
4 Distribute I deploy current cash resources effectively I more 
efficient utilisation of cash 
5 Enable or facilitate exit of disinvesting shareholder X X 
6 Increase return on shareholders' equity X X 
7 Shares held by share incentive trust surplus to requirements 
8 Dispose of shares held by share incentive scheme to comply with 
JSE Requirements X 
9 In anticipation of, or to facilitate, winding up X 
10 Facilitate introduction of BEE participant X 
11 Remove uncertainty regarding shareholder's involvement in 
company 
12 Termination of strategic alliance 
13 Settlement of claim by company against shareholder 
14 Capitalise on opportunity presented by shareholder's disposal of 
investment in company X 
15 Reduce cost of capital X 
16 Reduce the discount at which ordinary shares are trading relative 
to its underlying value X 
17 Comply with undertaking to underpin value of shares by 
reJlurchasin~ at setj)fice 
18 Take advantage of low share price 
19 Stabilise share price 
20 Resolve a dispute between company and shareholder 
21 Unlock shareholder value for departing shareholders 
22 Repurchase in the best interests of company and shareholders 
23 Eliminate N shares 
24 Shares trading_at discount 
25 Termination or contraction of share incentive scheme due to value 
of shares being lower than purchase I current price 
26 Eliminate cross-holding 
27 Facilitate a clearer focus on the company's future X 
28 Other I Reason not specified X X X 
-o 
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BoE BRANDCORP CAPITEC CCN CEP CHESTER CONNECTION CONTROL CULLINAN 
I Enhance the company's earnings per share x x 
2 Enhance the company's net asset value per share 
3 Create, minimise or enhance value for shareholder x 
4 Distribute / deploy current cash resources effectively / more efficient 
utilisation of cash 
5 Enable or facilitate exit of disinvesting shareholder x 
6 Increase return on shareholders' equity x 
7 Shares held by share incentive trust surplus to requirements 
8 Dispose of shares held by share incentive scheme to comply with JSE 
Requirements x 
9 In anticipation of, or to facilitate, winding up x 
IO Facilitate introduction of BEE participant 
II Remove uncertainty regarding shareholder's involvement in company 
12 Termination of strategic alliance x 
13 Settlement of claim by company against shareholder 
14 Capitalise on opportunity presented by shareholder's disposal of 
investment in company 
15 Reduce cost of capital 
16 Reduce the discount at which ordinary shares are trading relative to its 
underlying value 
17 Comply with undertaking to underpin value of shares by repurchasing at 
set price x 
18 Take advantage of low share price 
19 Stabilise share price 
20 Resolve a dispute between company and shareholder 
21 Unlock shareholder value for departing shareholders 
22 Repurchase in the best interests of company and shareholders 
23 Eliminate N shares 
24 Shares trading at discount 
2S Termination or contraction of share incentive scheme due to value of 
shares being lower than purchase / current price 
26 Eliminate cross-holding X 
27 Facilitate a clearer focus on the company's future 
28 Other / Reason not speci fied x x 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Appendix B (ctd) 
DALYS DAWNl DAWN2 DlGICORE EMN FORTUNE GLOBAL GOLD GRINDROD 
VILLAGE REEF 
I Enhance the company's earnings per share X X 
2 Enhance the company's net asset value per share X 
3 Create, minimise or enhance value for shareholder X X X 
4 Distribute I deploy current cash resources effectively I more 
efficient utilisation of cash X X X 
5 Enable or facilitate exit of disinvesting shareholder 
6 Increase return on shareholders' equity X 
7 Shares held by share incentive trust surplus to requirements 
8 Dispose of shares held by share incentive scheme to comply 
with JSE Requirements 
9 In anticipation of, or to facilitate, winding up 
10 Facilitate introduction of BEE participant X 
II Remove uncertainty regarding shareholder's involvement in 
company 
12 Termination of strategic alliance 
13 Settlement of claim bv companv against shareholder 
14 Capitalise on opportunity presented by shareholder's disposal of 
investment in company 
15 Reduce cost of capital 
16 Reduce the discount at which ordinary shares are trading 
relative to its underlying value 
17 Comply with undertaking to underpin value of shares by 
repurchasing at set price 
18 Take advantage of low share price X 
19 Stabilise share price X 
20 Resolve a dispute between company and shareholder X 
21 Unlock shareholder value for departing shareholders 
22 Repurchase in the best interests of company and shareholders 
23 Eliminate N shares 
24 Shares trading at discount 
25 Termination or contraction of share incentive scheme due to 
value of shares being lower than purchase I current price 
26 Eliminate cross-holding 
27 Facilitate a clearer focus on the company's future 
28 Other I Reason not specified X 
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Appendix B (ctd) 
GRlNTEK HOSKEN INDEQUITY INVESTEC INVICTA IOTA LA GROUP 1 LA GROUP 2 MORlBO 
I Enhance the company's earnings per share x x x 
2 Enhance the company's net asset value per share x x 
3 Create, minimise or enhance value for shareholder 
4 Distribute / deploy current cash resources effectively / more 
efficient utilisation of cash 
5 Enable or facilitate exit of disinvesting_ shareholder 
6 Increase return on shareholders' equit~ 
7 Shares held by share incentive trust sUlJllus to n~quirements 
8 Dispose of shares held by share incentive scheme to comply 
with JSE Requirements x 
9 In anticipation of, or to facilitate, winding up 
10 Facilitate introduction of BEE participant 
II Remove uncertainty regarding shareholder's involvement in 
company 
12 Termination of strategic alliance 
13 Settlement of claim by company against shareholder x 
14 Capitalise on opportunity presented by shareholder's disposal 
of investment in comJlany 
15 Reduce cost of capital 
16 Reduce the discount at which ordinary shares are trading 
relative to its underlying value 
17 Comply with undertaking to underpin value of shares by 
repurchasing at set price 
18 Take advantage of low share jlfice 
19 Stabilise share price 
20 Resolve a dispute between company and shareholder 
21 Unlock shareholder value for departing shareholders x 
22 Repurchase in the best interests of company and shareholders x 
23 Eliminate N shares x 
24 Shares trading at discount 
25 Termination or contraction of share incentive scheme due to 
value of shares beinglower than purchase / current price 
26 Eliminate cross-holding 
27 Facilitate a clearer focus on the company's future 
28 Other / Reason not s]Jecified x 
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M&R MUSTEK NETACTIVE NETCARE ONELOGIX OZZ PARACON 1 PARACON 2 PEREGRINE PSG 
I Enhance the company's earnings per share X X X X 
2 Enhance the com£llny's net a,set value per share X 
3 Create, minimise or enhance value for shareholder X X 
4 Distribute / deploy current cash resources 
effectively / more efficient utilisation of cash X X 
5 Enable or facilitate exit of disinvesting shareholder 
6 Increa,e return on shareholders' equity 
7 Shares held by share incentive trust surplus to 
requirements 
8 Dispose of shares held by share incentive scheme 
to comply with JSE Requirements 
9 In anticipation of, or to facilitate, winding up 
10 Facilitate introduction of BEE participant 
11 Remove uncertainty regarding shareholder's 
involvement in com~any X X 
12 Termination of strategic alliance X 
13 Settlement of claim by company against 
shareholder 
14 Capitalise on opportunity presented by 
shareholder's disposal of investment in com~a~ 
15 Reduce cost of capital 
16 Reduce the discount at which ordinary shares are 
trading relati ve to its underlying value 
17 Comply with undertaking to underpin value of 
shares by repurchasing at set price 
18 Take advantage of low share price 
19 Stabilise share price 
20 Resolve a dispute between company and 
shareholder 
21 Unlock shareholder value for departing 
shareholders 
22 Repurchase in the best interests of company and 
shareholders 
23 Eli min ate N shares 
24 Shares trading at discount X 
25 Termination or contraction of share incentive 
scheme due to value of shares being lower than X 
purchase/curren t price 
26 Eliminate cross-holding 
27 Facilitate a clearer focus on the company's future 
28 Other / Reason not sj)Ccified X X 
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1 Enhance the company's earnings per share 
2 Enhance the company's net asset value per share 
3 Create, minimise or enhance value for shareholder 
4 Distribute / deploy current cash resources effectively / 
more efficient utilisation of cash 
5 Enable or facilitate exit of disinvesting shareholder 
6 Increase return on shareholders' equity 
7 Shares held by share incentive trust surplus to 
requirements 
8 Dispose of shares held by share incentive scheme to 
comply with JSE Requirements 
9 In anticipation of, or to facilitate, winding up 
10 Facilitate introduction of BEE participant 
11 Remove uncertainty regarding shareholder's 
involvement in company 
12 Termination of strategic alliance 
13 Settlement of claim by company against shareholder 
14 Capitalise on opportunity presented by shareholder's 
disposal of investment in company 
15 Reduce cost of capital 
16 Reduce the discount at which ordinary shares are 
trading relative to its underlying value 
17 Comply with undertaking to underpin value of shares 
by repurchasing at set price 
18 Take advantage of low share price 
19 Stabilise share price 
20 Resolve a dispute between company and shareholder 
21 Unlock shareholder value for departing shareholders 
22 Repurchase in the best interests of company and 
shareholders 
23 Eliminate N shares 
24 Shares trading at discount 
25 Termination or contraction of share incentive scheme due to 
value of shares being lower than purchase/current price 
26 Eliminate cross-holding 
27 Facilitate a clearer focus on the company's future 
28 Other / Reason not specified 
"ppen IX C A d' B ( td) 
PURPLE PURPLE QUYN 1 QUYN 2 
1 2 
X 
X 
X 
X 
RAND SEARDEL SHOPRITE 
LEASES 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
TRANSPACO UCS 
X 
X 
ZARARA 
X 
X 
o 
00 
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Appendix C 
S fR h ummanes 0 epurc ases 
NAME OF COMPANY AECI AQUILA (1) ASPEN (1) BJM 
ANNOUNCEMENT II DEC 2000 2 MAR 2001 30 MAR 2001 looer 2001 
TYPE OF OFFER SPECIFIC PRO RATA SPECIFIC SPECIFIC 
CANCELLED/TREASURY BOTH BOTH TREASURY UNSTATED 
PERCENTAGE TARGETED 40% 17.668% 5.1% 6.6% 
PRICE MARKET PREMIUM OF DISCOUNT OF 3.6% DISCOUNT OF 
13.64% 18.5%TONAV 
DIRECTORS' INTEREST LESS THAN 1% 27.8% ORD; 55.10% 49.2% 
lOO%ORD A 
NAME OF COMPANY BRANDCORP CONNECTION CONTROL CULLINAN 
ANNOUNCEMENT 23 APR 2002 20 SEPT 2002 6 DEC 2002 27 MAR 2001 
TYPE OF OFFER SPECIFIC PRO RATA SPECIFIC SPECIFIC 
CANCELLED/TREASURY BOTH CANCELLED BOTH CANCELLED 
PERCENTAGE TARGETED 43.7% 10% 13.6% 6.85% 
PRICE PREMIUM OF 13% MARKET PREMIUM OF 2% PREMIUM OF 
WEIGHTED 900% 
AVERAGE 
DIRECTORS' INTEREST 17.44% 6.15%* 19.9% 66.83% 
NAME OF COMPANY DAWN (2) GOLD REEF HOSKEN INVESTEC 
ANNOUNCEMENT 26 JUNE 2002 20 MAR 2002 14 NOVEMBER 2002 22 APRIL 2002 
TYPE OF OFFER SPECIFIC PRO RATA PRO RATA SPECIFIC 
CANCELLED/TREASURY BOTH TREASURY CANCELLED CANCELLED 
PERCENTAGE TARGETED 32.88% 8% 75% 0.61% 
PRICE PREMIUM OF 21.6% PREMIUM OF PREMIUM OF 15.9% PREMIUM OF 
TO 29.7% 20% 33.7% 
DIRECTORS' INTEREST 9.41% UNSPECIFIED 2.72% 1.78% 
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,ppen IX C A d· C ( td) 
NAME OF COMPANY INVICTA MORIBO M&R MUSTEK 
ANNOUNCEMENT 27 MAY 2003 20 FEB 2003 18 DEC 2000 16JAN 2003 
TYPE OF OFFER SPECIFIC SPECIFIC SPECIFIC PRO RATA 
CANCELLED/TREASURY BOTH CANCELLED CANCELLED CANCELLED 
PERCENTAGE TARGETED 23% 5.48% 4.1% 10% 
PRICE DISCOUNT OF MARKET PREMIUM OF 4% MARKET 
2.49% WEIGHTED (WEIGHTED 
AVERAGE AVERAGE) 
DIRECTORS' INTEREST 50% 4.68% LESS THAN 1% 26.43% 
NAME OF COMPANY NETCARE PARA CON (2) PEREGRINE PSG 
ANNOUNCEMENT 20 NOV 2002 14 NOV 2001 25 MAY 2001 9 FEB 2001 
TYPE OF OFFER SPECIFIC SPECIFIC SPECIFIC SPECIFIC 
CANCELLED/TREASURY TREASURY BOTH TREASURY CANCELLED 
PERCENTAGE TARGETED 39% 5% 10% 9.03% 
PRICE UNSPECIFIED DISCOUNT OF 41 % DISCOUNT OF PREMIUM OF 190% 
PREMIUM 9.6% 
DIRECTORS 'INTEREST 11.7% 23% 14.6% 16.2% 
NAME OF COMPANY PURPLE CAP (1) PURPLE CAP (2) QUYN HOLDINGS SHOPRITE 
ANNOUNCEMENT 20 APRIL 2000 13 JUNE 2002 1 JULY 2002 4 OCT 2001 
TYPE OF OFFER SPECIFIC SPECIFIC SPECIFIC SPECIFIC 
CANCELLED/TREASURY BOTH CANCELLED BOTH BOTH 
PERCENTAGE TARGETED 31.31% 9.48% 14% 13.36% 
PRICE PREMIUM OF MARKET DISCOUNT OF 2.6% PREMIUM OF 107% 
20.8% 
DIRECTORS' INTEREST 4.2% 38.73% 13.95% 15.39% 
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Appendix C (ctd) 
NAME OF COMPANY TRANSPACO UCS 
ANNOUNCEMENT 8 DEC 2000 27 FEB 2003 
TYPE OF OFFER SPECIRC SPECIRC 
CANCELLED ffREASURY TREASURY CANCELLED 
PERCENTAGE TARGETED 7.96% 11.54% 
PRICE PREMIUM OF MARKET 
25.9% 
DIRECTORS' INTEREST 57.93% 44% 
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Days to 
announcement AECI 
248 28.14% 
240 25.94% 
220 48.62% 
200 33.26% 
180 30.94% 
160 21.58% 
140 22.00% 
120 25.58% 
100 25.12% 
80 17.84% 
60 19.29% 
40 5.98% 
20 1.15% 
19 1.25% 
18 -0.21% 
17 2.01% 
16 2.02% 
15 2.91% 
14 2.93% 
13 1.90% 
12 1.41% 
11 10.04% 
10 10.00% 
9 10.55% 
8 10.69% 
7 5.93% 
6 2.71% 
5 0.09% 
4 -2.68% 
3 -2.07% 
2 -3.20% 
1 0.24% 
0 0 
Appendix D1 
CARs from Commencement of Observation Period 
to Announcement date 
AQUILA ASPEN BJM BRANDCORP CONNECTION CONTROL CULLINAN 
3.55% 42.59% 23.73% 21.18% -3.81% 10.30% 92.79% 
2.58% 36.55% 10.48% 16.12% -3.49% -23.43% 74.81% 
-5.09% 41.43% 6.05% 9.19% -25.32% -16.01% 46.25% 
-0.54% 39.49% 0.43% 4.41% -13.75% -38.36% 45.89% 
1.52% 31.30% 23.01% 5.69% -16.68% -44.99% 68.98% 
-35.43% 41.79% 36.49% 21.90% -31.40% -24.74% 66.75% 
-33.50% 41.77% 6.65% 11.45% -20.85% -18.08% 58.16% 
-36.26% 36.25% -5.85% 12.25% -28.44% -8.75% 60.29% 
-24.03% 33.69% -6.33% 8.97% -16.94% -47.08% 54.33% 
-27.52% 20.02% 7.11% 3.74% -2.89% -24.12% 48.86% 
-36.11% 13.27% -2.22% -3.54% 6.31% -4.70% 60.52% 
-35.54% 24.41% 1.39% -4.69% 9.47% 0.08% 34.44% 
-21.22% 6.17% 3.36% -5.85% -3.62% 0.97% 33.29% 
-23.63% 6.30% 3.27% -3.26% -0.82% 4.92% 32.28% 
-20.16% 8.38% -0.26% -3.48% 1.08% 5.64% 31.50% 
-22.54% 6.76% -6.14% -8.42% 3.39% 4.35% 30.92% 
-19.39% 2.26% -3.54% -8.55% 3.31% 4.03% 30.29% 
-18.52% 2.29% -6.02% 0.92% 8.16% 3.81% 28.91% 
-18.51% 2.29% -7.17% 0.65% 7.79% 3.50% 27.87% 
-18.47% 2.57% -4.55% -0.02% 0.54% 3.12% 27.21% 
-14.10% 4.93% -3.78% -3.29% 0.35% 3.04% 26.33% 
-9.01% 4.94% -1.67% -0.79% 2.74% -6.22% 25.52% 
-4.29% 0.36% -3.24% -1.03% 2.17% -6.42% 25.15% 
0.43% -0.65% -2.80% -1.68% 1.62% -6.77% 25.13% 
9.42% -0.87% -1.50% -2.08% 1.07% 2.96% 25.26% 
8.41% -0.85% -1.48% -2.93% 2.96% 1.75% 24.64% 
4.90% 0.54% -1.44% -7.19% 3.06% 1.56% 24.17% 
8.07% -0.87% -1.84% -2.90% 0.78% 1.47% 23.11% 
7.15% -3.33% -1.79% 1.12% 0.39% 3.14% 22.29% 
3.59% -0.66% -1.70% 0.81% -5.09% 2.88% 22.60% 
0.10% 2.78% -1.27% 0.55% -4.95% 0.60% 22.42% 
0.10% 0.45% -0.91% 0.25% 0.43% 0.40% 1.23% 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
112 
DAWN GOLD REEF 
81.61% 6.33% 
71.40% 7.09% 
65.09% 11.61% 
85.84% 19.01% 
65.54% 19.46% 
45.24% 13.12% 
44.53% 12.49% 
40.46% 9.77% 
33.18% 16.56% 
7.92% 15.34% 
6.55% 2.94% 
6.42% 3.12% 
6.66% -1.73% 
3.76% 4.19% 
17.04% 3.58% 
16.72% 3.51% 
16.31% 3.26% 
16.01% -0.95% 
3.85% -0.64% 
3.63% -3.04% 
3.36% -1.79% 
3.07% -2.18% 
2.78% -5.49% 
2.41% -9.43% 
2.19% -5.71% 
1.90% -2.35% 
1.61% -4.59% 
1.32% -7.91% 
1.01% -6.56% 
0.73% -6.82% 
0.43% -6.59% 
0.19% -3.35% 
0 0 
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Appendix Dl (ctd) 
Days to 
announcement HOSKEN INVESTEC INVICTA MORIBO M&R MUSTEK NETCARE PARACON PEREGRINE PSG 
248 61.24% -24.54% -12.37% 57.35% 59.82% 11.26% -3.41% 38.04% 21.13% 32.40% 
240 53.76% -26.25% -16.21% 29.87% 67.79% 11.83% -3.61% 54.12% 46.40% 22.23% 
220 44.68% -21.74% -20.47% 60.25% 70.60% 11.15% -3.11% 50.43% 48.30% 4.40% 
200 33.87% -24.35% -24.61% 42.90% 45.37% 9.82% -3.39% 52.05% 57.06% -7.37% 
180 20.38% -23.14% -27.56% 87.43% 31.60% 6.42% -0.45% 47.83% 59.45% 0.56% 
160 11.91% -23.76% -19.08% 83.21% 20.52% 4.84% -0.05% 9.61% 37.41% 1.62% 
140 11.00% -21.89% -14.19% 42.19% 14.56% -10.90% -0.90% 8.40% 34.12% -6.26% 
120 14.30% -20.46% 4.26% 62.17% 12.04% 6.49% -3.81% 15.12% -1.68% -25.24% 
100 0.80% -20.49% -10.00% -0.04% 7.03% 5.86% -4.73% -11.62% 12.03% -19.91% 
80 -16.86% -21.19% -14.95% 2.06% 17.38% 3.10% -3.87% -9.11% 22.55% -22.04% 
60 -5.54% -18.07% -8.71% 8.92% 27.08% 3.35% -2.66% -12.59% 9.92% -22.11% 
40 6.18% -8.34% -13.52% 51.99% 9.90% 3.20% -1.52% -14.59% 5.49% -15.69% 
20 2.05% -4.59% -12.64% 46.21% 9.40% -0.82% 0.67% -24.81% -9.91% -1.27% 
19 1.95% -2.86% -12.88% 46.27% 9.30% -0.37% 0.70% -21.77% -5.53% 1.92% 
18 1.85% -2.02% -13.30% 46.34% 9.18% -0.22% 0.40% -27.91% -7.39% 0.26% 
17 1.70% -1.80% -13.75% 46.09% 5.70% -0.67% 0.08% -27.92% -9.33% 1.03% 
16 1.60% -2.76% -13.95% 46.00% 4.02% 0.33% -0.28% -28.08% -7.06% 2.10% 
15 1.48% -4.37% -14.10% 45.89% 3.62% -0.09% -0.25% -27.80% -7.03% 3.91% 
14 1.43% -6.32% -14.21% 46.09% 2.29% 1.08% -0.17% -25.45% -8.98% 0.73% 
13 1.34% -2.81% -17.70% 45.57% -0.95% 0.70% 0.31% -27.60% -6.75% 4.58% 
12 1.32% -1.58% -14.32% 45.54% -1.04% 0.17% 0.76% -25.32% -2.45% 6.25% 
11 0.24% 0.61% -14.90% 44.61% 2.03% 0.06% 0.75% -22.78% -8.10% 7.32% 
10 1.12% -0.97% -13.32% 44.45% -1.41% 0.16% 1.57% -16.77% -10.84% 7.80% 
9 -0.04% -1.68% -13.76% 44.31% -3.36% 0.31% 2.61% -13.85% -7.77% 6.99% 
8 -0.13% -3.57% -14.28% 43.89% -5.24% 0.72% 2.74% -10.14% -9.77% 7.66% 
7 0.74% 0.02% -14.50% 43.51% -3.63% 0.88% 2.79% -8.94% -14.20% 6.69% 
6 0.14% 1.45% -19.85% 43.51% -3.92% -0.04% 2.44% -14.86% -9.35% 7.42% 
5 0.50% 3.26% -7.76% 43.44% -4.08% 0.27% 1.70% -13.22% -6.97% 7.42% 
4 0.41% 1.49% -2.52% 43.08% -2.65% 0.68% 0.83% -15.61% -6.55% 7.44% 
3 0.31% -0.49% -2.81% 42.52% -2.71% 1.50% -0.06% -13.53% -2.67% 5.43% 
2 0.21% -0.11% -4.17% 0.36% 0.29% 0.73% -0.09% -13.96% 3.62% 4.18% 
1 0.12% 1.71% 0.27% -0.13% -1.28% -0.62% -0.03% -14.62% 5.58% 0.59% 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix D1 (ctd) 
Days to 
announcement PURPLE CAP 1 PURPLE CAP 2 QUYN SHOPRITE TRANSPACOGEN UCS AVERAGE 
248 83.35% -193.36% -130.72% 22.18% 27.23% 21.32% 13.06% 
240 77.05% -231.44% -101.25% 18.19% 43.89% 20.97% 10.03% 
220 81.56% -219.91% -158.11% 18.04% 55.20% 16.35% 6.89% 
200 70.34% -342.21% -110.71% 14.09% 32.36% 19.24% -1.64% 
180 141.81% -257.19% -109.30% 20.19% 39.94% 12.43% 6.95% 
160 136.28% -266.09% -144.54% 26.49% 25.36% 2.60% 0.18% 
140 105.73% -326.27% -197.91% 10.10% 9.85% -1.14% -11.40% 
120 103.21% -335.07% -233.33% 6.09% -7.32% -2.81% -14.47% 
100 93.08% -347.36% -277.71% -9.52% -5.81% -16.94% -24.12% 
80 88.11% -199.19% -141.15% -4.74% -15.45% -8.03% -12.20% 
60 60.58% -167.65% -224.73% -5.50% 11.62% -7.70% -13.54% 
40 21.41 % -92.67% -47.49% -7.62% 18.12% -17.52% -3.60% 
20 5.22% -116.67% -77.75% 0.39% 19.67% -8.90% -6.67% 
19 5.17% -92.45% -78.55% -0.21% 19.55% -8.75% -5.06% 
18 4.77% -92.89% -79.18% 1.03% 25.07% -8.83% -4.68% 
17 28.81% -93.32% -61.12% 0.63% 19.25% -0.40% -3.56% 
16 28.42% -93.68% -61.57% 1.25% 19.05% -8.41% -3.75% 
15 14.05% -94.48% -11.00% 0.47% 19.04% -8.41% -1.83% 
14 13.64% -94.93% -12.07% -0.25% 18.84% -8.60% -2.78% 
13 13.23% -95.85% -10.02% -2.65% 18.25% -8.55% -3.18% 
12 12.96% -96.45% -10.90% -7.76% 18.20% -8.62% -2.95% 
11 11.48% -97.15% -11.05% -5.12% 17.47% -6.85% -2.42% 
10 11.38% -58.01% -11.37% -2.60% 17.24% -8.38% -0.62% 
9 10.86% -58.46% -13.28% -2.72% 17.25% -0.24% -0.16% 
8 10.47% -58.69% -12.88% -3.26% 11.17% -0.48% 0.23% 
7 24.85% -59.39% -14.78% -1.32% -2.24% -0.42% 0.03% 
6 24.05% -60.19% -14.25% -1.31% -1.46% -0.47% -0.77% 
5 2.68% -61.17% -3.38% -5.49% 1.91% -0.35% -0.50% 
4 1.40% -61.86% -0.68% -2.74% 1.11% -8.26% -0.56% 
3 -1.20% -62.42% 2.09% -1.98% 1.36% -0.20% -0.55% 
2 -0.48% -63.11% 0.47% -2.77% 0.68% -0.06% -3.37% 
1 -0.22% -49.14% 0.17% 0.74% 0.31% -0.05% -2.33% 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
115 
Appendix D2 
CARs from Announcement Date 
Davsfrom 
Announcement AECI AQUILA ASPEN BJM BRANDCORP CONNECTION CONTROL CULLINAN DAWN GOLD REEF 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 9.97% -0.10% 8.53% -1.18% -3.71% -5.09% -0.24% -0.91% -0.36% 3.66% 
2 13.22% 6.21% 8.57% -1.16% 2.23% -8.07% -0.47% -2.64% -0.72% 3.63% 
3 12.86% 6.09% 7.41% 1.02% -0.47% -6.24% -0.76% -2.49% -1.00% 3.37% 
4 11.12% 5.04% 7.08% 1.03% -4.78% -6.35% -1.00% -2.61% -1.29% 0.27% 
5 12.87% 4.91% 6.75% 1.13% 4.30% -6.24% -1.12% 21.89% 6.65% 0.17% 
6 12.66% 5.71% 1.18% -0.76% 4.63% -6.54% -1.32% 0.82% 11.30% -0.77% 
7 12.97% 4.75% 4.56% -0.26% 3.47% -1.56% -1.58% 24.45% 8.54% -1.06% 
8 11.74% 4.66% 4.56% -2.61% 2.84% -1.61% -9.80% 4.12% 8.20% -0.90% 
9 11.20% 4.51% 7.95% -4.61% 2.59% -6.87% -4.69% 2.92% 5.50% -3.14% 
10 8.85% 6.34% 7.78% -4.56% 1.90% -9.38% -4.95% -23.53% 5.30% -1.24% 
11 9.81% 5.96% 5.46% -4.50% 1.45% -9.71% -5.27% 42.00% 5.05% -1.93% 
12 11.69% 6.62% 8.17% -0.17% 5.11% -7.20% -5.50% 21.40% 4.77% 0.95% 
13 11.63% 5.56% 13.58% -2.24% 4.94% -1.97% -5.62% 20.20% -8.03% -1.29% 
14 12.45% 6.46% 15.90% -4.22% 4.46% -2.81% -4.87% 18.58% 0.22% 0.59% 
15 11.36% 5.69% 17.94% -3.77% 8.17% -5.46% -5.09% 17.75% -13.30% 0.13% 
16 11.38% 7.31% 18.89% -4.19% 7.50% -3.62% -4.33% 16.46% 13.64% -0.14% 
17 10.80% 4.64% 18.92% -4.15% 7.24% -3.47% -3.51% 16.22% 3.89% -0.72% 
18 11.83% 5.51% 19.01% -4.10% 7.06% -3.73% -2.84% 15.27% 19.53% -1.23% 
19 12.22% 6.03% 23.06% -4.01% 6.72% -3.96% -3.16% 14.06% 17.11% -1.44% 
20 14.24% 7.69% 23.75% -3.55% 6.43% -1.69% -3.42% 12.91% 9.96% -0.85% 
21 15.33% 7.49% 19.10% 0.33% 6.23% 0.19% -4.68% 11.35% 9.52% -1.21% 
22 11.71% 6.69% 19.06% 0.34% 5.86% 2.20% -4.89% 10.73% -0.70% -5.51% 
23 14.81% 5.64% 23.80% 8.46% 5.71% 6.54% -5.13% -14.89% -0.97% -5.70% 
24 19.88% 5.38% 28.13% 12.35% 5.52% 6.50% -3.41% -15.71% -1.36% -6.08% 
25 18.64% 5.15% 29.67% 12.35% 5.34% 10.49% -3.68% -16.66% 9.61% -2.61% 
26 20.54% 9.14% 34.93% 12.47% 6.56% 10.50% -3.91% -17.22% 9.32% -6.74% 
27 20.46% 5.37% 35.25% 14.53% 5.38% 10.34% -2.82% -17.49% 9.13% -7.39% 
28 19.72% 9.52% 40.30% 18.13% 5.00% 7.79% 0.97% -18.07% 8.93% -4.25% 
29 21.35% 6.34% 40.56% 19.90% 4.77% 6.96% 1.69% -18.65% 8.51% -9.37% 
30 24.50% 6.32% 38.20% 25.00% 4.43% 4.79% 1.56% -19.74% 8.12% -10.11% 
40 21.41% 9.33% 41.42% 17.21% 8.83% 2.12% -6.61% 37.77% -13.64% -13.44% 
60 20.94% 26.58% 39.42% 2.04% 3.21% -12.08% -26.54% 71.79% 4.30% -21.31% 
80 20.93% 19.35% 47.95% 4.68% -0.34% -2.68% -29.79% 65.73% 7.58% -16.86% 
100 29.13% 15.47% 49.15% 5.46% 23.49% -17.67% -37.22% 105.01% 20.19% -18.87% 
120 28.88% 13.88% 48.31% 32.06% 21.53% -10.42% -38.03% 89.49% 30.66% -5.42% 
140 28.41% 7.97% 43.60% 27.60% 20.74% -14.55% -33.79% 21.52% 24.97% -11.31% 
160 23.88% 9.95% 53.75% 31.08% 27.02% -13.61% -43.37% -3.05% 26.69% -30.26% 
180 17.29% 12.74% 32.86% 28.01% 23.65% -17.42% -22.61% 31.89% 36.71% -31.56% 
200 11.13% -3.75% 35.68% 26.86% 5.21% -7.01% -14.37% 46.86% 33.74% -27.02% 
220 -0.33% 2.92% 49.79% 21.91% 22.98% -7.11% -5.72% 127.17% 29.02% -38.25% 
240 16.38% -7.98% 50.68% 25.65% 9.78% -0.80% -0.09% 69.78% 39.80% -37.89% 
260 14.55% -9.79% 55.91% 41.75% 12.05% -0.56% 1.73% 120.33% 31.02% -29.99% 
280 15.64% -7.08% 57.01% 22.80% 9.25% 11.16% -2.14% 120.62% 31.02% -25.92% 
300 13.52% -1.47% 57.45% 24.68% 3.24% 20.82% -5.16% 102.14% 49.53% -23.92% 
320 27.02% 2.55% 54.41% 30.28% 16.07% 16.26% -1.26% 88.24% 25.03% -15.75% 
340 24.59% -1.32% 48.45% 31.62% 14.42% 18.79% -13.58% 118.73% 39.31% -7.10% 
360 24.15% -10.70% 44.47% 31.61% 8.50% 9.53% -19.34% 129.00% 54.49% -10.27% 
380 26.65% -11.77% 40.59% 35.29% 19.00% 9.22% -3.62% 130.67% 59.26% -7.58% 
400 24.95% -11.75% 51.66% 29.00% 25.50% -4.32% 0.83% 108.96% 66.56% -8.85% 
420 21.26% -8.89% 57.13% 19.76% 30.17% -5.64% 7.30% 78.49% 62.48% -1.62% 
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Appendix D2 (ctd) 
Daysirom 
Announcement HOSKEN INVESTEG INVIGTA MORIBO M&R MUSTEK NETGARE PARAGON PEREGRINE PSG 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 -0.11% -4.20% -10.27% 56.73% 2.17% -0.20% -0.36% 16.33% -2.67% 3.92% 
2 4.63% -5.74% -10.36% 56.51% 9.04% -0.17% -0.13% 14.13% 0.38% 4.03% 
3 4.55% -7.00% -10.70% 56.60% 3.24% -0.37% -0.58% 7.68% 0.53% 2.45% 
4 4.46% -8.96% -11.04% 56.62% 2.90% 0.23% 0.18% 8.46% -4.21% 1.20% 
5 4.80% -11.26% -11.17% 56.13% -0.42% -0.22% 0.17% 6.15% -7.51% -1.09% 
6 6.57% -11.73% -2.05% 55.63% -0.05% -0.20% -0.12% 1.59% -3.18% -3.08% 
7 5.63% -10.95% -2.26% 55.26% 5.64% -16.85% -0.40% 4.74% -6.32% -4.79% 
8 5.60% -12.39% -2.71% 55.26% 11.32% 3.71% -0.87% 9.38% -4.92% -5.93% 
9 8.67% -12.71% -1.23% 55.79% 12.28% 3.32% -0.37% 10.98% -4.83% -1.47% 
10 6.76% -11.85% -1.48% 55.50% 11.87% 3.54% -0.43% 11.11% -4.66% -1.51% 
11 6.63% -9.31% -166% 46.56% 10.78% 4.00% -0.48% 11.12% -0.73% -2.73% 
12 8.32% -7.97% -3.25% 46.67% 10.94% 3.33% -0.88% 9.27% -2.23% 2.01% 
13 8.25% -7.28% -3.50% 46.69% 18.57% 3.25% -1.93% 10.68% -2.10% 4.44% 
14 9.06% -6.67% -2.44% 46.43% 17.66% 4.24% -1.64% 8.99% 0.12% 0.40% 
15 8.10% -8.48% -2.61% 45.44% 16.02% 3.77% -0.24% 8.17% -1.38% -0.36% 
16 8.04% -9.26% -2.87% 44.85% 13.03% 3.93% -0.12% 4.23% -1.89% 2.11% 
17 7.93% -9.09% -2.99% 44.53% 11.75% 3.32% -0.48% -0.60% -1.59% -5.92% 
18 7.89% -7.91% -3.01% 43.62% 13.38% 3.31% -0.43% -0.36% 6.90% -8.85% 
19 7.81% -6.87% -2.93% 43.51% 15.76% 4.20% -1.29% 13.48% 7.17% -10.48% 
20 7.72% -6.04% -2.93% 43.90% 15.66% 3.69% -1.09% 7.62% -0.26% -15.68% 
21 9.83% -6.39% -3.02% 43.67% 15.25% 4.21% -0.62% 1.28% -0.08% -15.96% 
22 8.73% -6.85% -6.04% 43.59% 15.24% 4.32% -0.65% -5.56% -1.23% -13.87% 
23 9.51% -5.66% -6.18% 53.67% 15.23% 4.76% -0.92% -2.02% 0.10% -16.22% 
24 9.43% -5.28% -6.05% 53.32% 15.20% 4.50% -0.82% -5.41% -1.51% -16.04% 
25 9.35% -5.76% -6.40% 53.28% 14.97% 4.06% 0.36% -6.07% 0.35% -17.54% 
26 9.24% -5.43% -6.98% 52.93% 16.16% 4.31% 0.41% -5.56% 4.68% -21.62% 
27 9.15% -5.27% -7.07% 61.47% 17.49% 4.81% 0.45% -14.34% 6.84% -21.53% 
28 9.04% -4.64% -11.60% 60.63% 15.91% 3.45% 0.50% -6.49% 2.91% -15.57% 
29 8.95% -2.65% -12.15% 60.26% 15.73% 3.70% 0.42% 4.18% 3.06% -18.61% 
30 8.88% -3.03% -15.42% 60.18% 19.36% 4.47% 0.34% -0.83% 1.07% -18.36% 
40 9.99% -1.02% -13.73% 57.67% 24.20% 9.37% 0.67% 5.99% 6.06% -8.90% 
60 32.37% -4.91% -22.41% 49.99% 36.51% 9.46% -1.32% 1.08% -4.31% 12.77% 
80 48.21% -8.49% -26.18% 132.78% 43.33% 7.53% 1.46% -0.83% 23.21% 16.24% 
100 47.71% -2.69% -22.72% 126.79% 47.23% 9.62% 2.07% 0.48% 1.36% 26.40% 
120 46.14% -5.61% -13.80% 120.65% 49.28% 7.96% 1.61% 6.07% 12.82% 28.64% 
140 44.75% -4.04% -33.42% 113.57% 56.92% 8.47% 0.27% 23.74% 37.00% 45.22% 
160 40.07% -2.85% -19.81% 106.66% 46.72% 11.79% -3.15% 12.62% 34.92% 21.98% 
180 38.35% -4.37% -14.79% 100.84% 59.44% 12.18% -3.20% 12.03% 29.08% 18.83% 
200 36.17% -6.34% -8.40% 94.14% 52.14% 14.12% -1.41% 9.13% 31.18% 22.93% 
220 34.22% -8.00% -8.56% 68.74% 54.54% 15.91% -2.38% 32.89% 24.21% 25.41% 
240 31.99% -4.41% -12.07% 51.31% 54.20% 16.58% -4.39% 40.19% 31.84% 24.32% 
260 29.96% -3.59% -14.53% 48.13% 51.04% 19.32% -3.86% 44.93% 30.85% -1.60% 
280 27.75% -4.72% -13.73% 76.66% 35.89% 26.46% -4.52% 30.88% 27.24% -15.46% 
300 25.60% -7.21% -21.26% 72.62% 36.80% 22.97% -5.28% 23.76% 26.37% -1.96% 
320 23.58% -6.53% -20.19% 82.83% 51.11% 23.64% -5.66% 29.22% 26.58% 33.11% 
340 21.60% -8.96% -11.35% 77.25% 56.11% 22.93% -3.83% 22.99% 40.67% 24.44% 
360 19.60% -7.86% -10.40% 69.84% 59.21% 20.05% -3.65% 6.35% 52.60% 23.36% 
380 17.61% -10.24% -5.10% 23.67% 50.14% 20.00% -3.35% 25.72% 50.99% 28.05% 
400 15.62% -13.63% -11.47% 74.88% 46.25% 16.49% -2.58% 28.78% 57.27% 22.15% 
420 13.64% -17.92% -3.75% 92.39% 59.62% 15.26% -2.41% 32.01% 59.59% 19.58% 
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Appendix D2 (ctd) 
Days from 
Announcement PURPLE CAP 1 PURPLE CAP 2 QUYN SHOPRITE TRANSPACOGEN UCS AVERAGE 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0.22% 7.77% -21.36% -0.55% 0.30% -0.34% 1.84% 
2 0.03% -0.47% -19.23% 1.32% -3.78% -0.35% 2.44% 
3 -0.37% 23.87% -20.31% 4.41% 0.24% -0.50% 3.03% 
4 -0.93% 36.68% -21.73% 3.50% 0.59% -7.86% 3.57% 
5 23.68% 36.02% -22.81% 6.05% 0.64% -5.63% 4.04% 
6 22.95% 47.19% -23.03% 6.03% 0.50% -7.02% 5.84% 
7 22.28% 56.84% -22.30% 6.03% -0.04% -6.90% 4.84% 
8 21.87% 60.66% -21.49% 8.28% -0.65% -6.82% 5.69% 
9 21.74% 60.44% -22.78% 9.10% -0.70% -7.05% 4.80% 
10 21.33% 50.72% -21.88% 9.52% -1.11% -7.75% 6.88% 
11 13.84% 50.05% -22.74% 9.26% 1.11% -16.44% 5.14% 
12 13.31% 44.46% -23.42% 9.18% 0.90% -7.35% 5.78% 
13 12.91% 22.34% -24.72% 7.52% 2.74% -7.80% 4.71% 
14 12.70% 22.04% -23.68% 8.97% 2.76% -7.95% 5.02% 
15 11.92% 21.65% -22.13% 9.00% 3.78% -7.80% 4.12% 
16 11.26% 21.11% -21.90% 8.93% 4.09% 9.15% 5.77% 
17 2.84% 20.33% -20.42% 8.22% 3.38% -5.05% 3.62% 
18 -5.50% 19.44% -22.26% 8.89% 3.25% 3.28% 4.54% 
19 -5.78% 18.69% -24.34% 8.27% 2.82% 3.21% 4.88% 
20 -6.74% 4.69% -23.08% 9.10% 2.84% 3.16% 3.48% 
21 -6.52% 11.71% -25.05% 7.52% 2.21% 3.01% 3.59% 
22 -7.02% 11.29% -22.57% 8.98% -1.81% 2.54% 1.48% 
23 -7.09% 32.18% -22.20% 10.38% -5.65% 2.14% 3.39% 
24 9.46% 43.41% -20.79% 8.14% -4.03% -4.07% 4.49% 
25 8.95% 42.55% -18.33% 8.91% -4.41% -4.14% 5.03% 
26 8.56% 41.48% -19.06% 7.87% -3.88% -4.82% 5.23% 
27 8.50% 29.93% -20.74% 8.11% -3.94% -4.62% 4.73% 
28 8.31% 28.83% -20.96% 8.27% -4.46% -6.19% 4.97% 
29 8.32% 34.74% -22.10% 8.18% -4.58% 2.00% 5.80% 
30 0.96% 33.73% -22.58% 9.07% -4.24% 1.86% 5.39% 
40 -1.85% 16.40% -56.96% 10.02% -4.28% -0.24% 5.38% 
60 -11.50% -5.69% -69.61% -1.07% -4.33% -12.58% 3.92% 
80 -2.11% 7.15% -112.84% 4.79% -12.64% -9.46% 8.22% 
100 -0.87% 27.47% -153.55% 8.21% -13.90% -2.03% 9.65% 
120 -35.57% 52.43% 57.45% 2.85% -46.89% 0.79% 18.83% 
140 0.61% 50.95% 49.86% 17.87% -63.08% 10.73% 18.45% 
160 -39.64% 47.78% 17.87% 28.76% -67.67% 2.40% 13.72% 
180 -47.59% 4.29% 10.24% 23.88% -95.64% 23.86% 11.53% 
200 -39.54% -18.56% -39.62% 14.44% -93.77% 15.46% 7.50% 
220 -63.64% 25.67% -51.20% 9.08% -113.51% 22.93% 10.25% 
240 -20.02% 3.23% 89.20% 2.39% -111.21% 16.87% 15.72% 
260 -73.42% -18.40% 84.29% 6.74% -111.26% 17.72% 13.18% 
280 -15.28% -25.30% 70.40% 8.13% -54.26% 33.76% 16.84% 
300 -99.70% -2.87% 4.25% 12.68% -74.14% 20.06% 9.96% 
320 -128.91% -46.59% -1.24% 10.93% -74.95% 39.19% 10.75% 
340 -205.07% -44.07% -46.57% 10.31% -80.73% 34.44% 6.74% 
360 -116.70% -43.74% -36.23% -5.18% -85.76% 32.59% 8.37% 
380 -175.27% -33.01% -96.84% -11.86% -94.44% 29.29% 3.29% 
400 -182.43% -53.81% -68.11% -14.79% -96.98% 44.79% 4.20% 
420 -189.60% -79.12% -84.81% -9.64% -102.10% 47.99% 2.87% 
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Share Price at 
Announcement 
AECI 1145 
Aquila 110 
Aspen 415 
BJM 248 
Brandcorp 115 
Connection 40 
Control 98 
Cullinan 4 
DAWN 37 
Gold reef 250 
Hosken 205 
Investec 16920 
Invicta 700 
Moribo 7 
M&R 310 
Mustek 10.6 
Netcare 300 
Paracon 60 
Peregrine 250 
PSG 291 
Purple (1) 12 
Purple (2) 12 
Quyn 10 
Shoprite 613 
Transpaco 135 
UCS 65 
Appendix F 
Change in Share Prices 
Share Price 20 Days Share Price at 
After Announcement End of Period 
1350 2565 
119 160 
525 657 
236 210 
130 500 
41 142 
99 245 
4 22 
40 240 
261 710 
225 567 
16599 12661 
700 1700 
10 15 
370 1260 
9.6 15.2 
302 499 
64 52 
240 152 
244 225 
12 6 
13 5 
8 2 
670 766 
145 185 
65 130 
135 
% Increase at % Increase at 
20 Days End of Period 
17.90% 124.02% 
8.18% 45.45% 
26.51 % 58.31% 
-4.84% -15.32% 
13.04% 334.78% 
2.50% 255.00% 
1.02% 150.00% 
0.00% 450.00% 
8.11% 548.65% 
4.40% 184.00% 
9.76% 176.59% 
-1.90% -25.17% 
0.00% 142.86% 
42.86% 114.29% 
19.35% 306.45% 
-9.43% 43.40% 
0.67% 66.33% 
6.67% -13.33% 
-4.00% -39.20% 
-16.15% -22.68% 
0.00% -50.00% 
8.33% -58.33% 
-20.00% -80.00% 
9.30% 24.96% 
7.41% 37.04% 
0.00% 100.00% 
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